CVE-2026-26330: Envoy's global rate limit may crash when the response phase limit is enabled and the response phase request is failed directly
Summary At the rate limit filter, if we enabled the response phase limit with applyonstreamdone in the rate limit configuration and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy. Details When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request.
Published Mar 10, 2026 · Updated Mar 18, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/envoyproxy/envoy
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- = 1.37.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/envoyproxy/envoy
github.com/envoyproxy/envoy
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 1.36.0, <= 1.36.4
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/envoyproxy/envoy
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
At the rate limit filter, if we enabled the response phase limit with apply_on_stream_done in the rate limit configuration and the response phase limit request fails directly, it may crash Envoy.
Details
When both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled, the safe gRPC client instance will be re-used for both the request phase request and response phase request.
But after the request phase request is done, the inner state of the request phase limit request in gRPC client is not cleaned up. When we send the second limit request at response phase, and the second limit request fails directly, we may access the previous request's inner state and result in crash.
PoC
This need to mock the network failure. But we have reproduced by unit test locally.
Impact
This only happens when both the request phase limit and response phase limit are enabled in the rate limit filter, and requires the request to rate limit service fails directly (For example, if from Envoy's perspective, no healthy endpoint for rate limit service may result the request fails directly). That's say, not easy to trigger this.
To workaround
This could be worked around by splitting the rate limit filter. That is, if there is a rate limit filter that contains normal rate limit configuration (request phase limit, without apply_on_stream_done) and also rate limit configuration with apply_on_stream_done (response phase limit). Splitting them into two rate limit filters and ensure one filter only contains normal rate limit configuration (without apply_on_stream_done), and one only contains rate limit configuration with apply_on_stream_done could avoid this problem.
Credit
Mandar Jog ([email protected])
Credited to phlax, yanavlasov, botengyao, agrawroh.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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