CVE-2026-31807: SiYuan has a SVG Sanitizer Bypass via `<animate>` Element — Unauthenticated XSS
SVG Sanitizer Bypass via Element — Unauthenticated XSS Summary SiYuan's SVG sanitizer (SanitizeSVG) blocks dangerous elements ( , , ) and removes on event handlers and javascript: in href attributes. However, it does NOT block SVG animation elements ( , ) which can dynamically set attributes to dangerous values at runtime, bypassing the static sanitization.
Published Mar 10, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260310025236-297bd526708f
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260310025236-297bd526708f
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
SVG Sanitizer Bypass via <animate> Element — Unauthenticated XSS
Summary
SiYuan's SVG sanitizer (SanitizeSVG) blocks dangerous elements (<script>, <iframe>, <foreignobject>) and removes on* event handlers and javascript: in href attributes. However, it does NOT block SVG animation elements (<animate>, <set>) which can dynamically set attributes to dangerous values at runtime, bypassing the static sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject executable JavaScript into the unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint (type=8), creating a reflected XSS.
This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-29183 (fixed in v3.5.9).
Affected Component
- File:
kernel/util/misc.go - Function:
SanitizeSVG()(lines 234-319) - Endpoint:
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=...(unauthenticated) - Version: SiYuan <= 3.5.9
Root Cause
The sanitizer checks attributes on elements at parse time. SVG <animate> and <set> elements modify attributes at runtime — these elements are not in the sanitizer's blocklist.
Sanitizer's blocklist (line 250)
if tag == "script" || tag == "iframe" || tag == "object" || tag == "embed" || tag == "foreignobject" {
n.RemoveChild(c)
// ...
}Missing from blocklist: animate, set, animateTransform, animateMotion
Attribute check (lines 264-267)
// Only checks static attributes
if strings.HasPrefix(key, "on") {
continue
}The <animate> element's values attribute contains the payload (javascript:...), but the sanitizer only checks for on* prefix, href, or xlink:href keys. The values, to, from, attributeName attributes are all passed through.
Proof of Concept
Vector 1: <animate> sets href to javascript:
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><animate attributeName="href" values="javascript:alert(document.domain)" begin="0s" fill="freeze"/><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text><text>&color=blueAfter template rendering, the SVG contains:
<svg ...>
<text ...></text>
<animate attributeName="href" values="javascript:alert(document.domain)" begin="0s" fill="freeze"/>
<text x="50%" y="80%" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text>
<text></text>
</svg>The sanitizer passes this through because:
<animate>is not in the element blocklistattributeName="href"— key isattributename, doesn't start withon, nothrefitselfvalues="javascript:..."— key isvalues, nothref
When the SVG is rendered in the browser (navigating directly to the URL), <animate> sets the parent ` element's href to javascript:alert(document.domain)`. Clicking "Click me" triggers the JavaScript.
Vector 2: <set> modifies event handlers
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><set attributeName="onmouseover" to="alert(document.domain)"/><text>&color=blueThe <set> element dynamically adds an onmouseover event handler to the parent element at runtime.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker crafts a malicious
getDynamicIconURL with XSS payload - Attacker sends the URL to a victim who has an active SiYuan session
- Victim clicks/navigates to the URL
- SVG renders with Content-Type
image/svg+xml— browser renders as standalone SVG document - JavaScript executes in the SiYuan server's origin
- Attacker steals session cookies, API tokens, or makes authenticated API calls to read/modify notes
Impact
- Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS ~9.1)
- Type: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)
- Unauthenticated reflected XSS via SVG injection
- Executes in the SiYuan application origin, giving full access to authenticated APIs
- Can chain to: data exfiltration, note modification, configuration theft (API tokens, auth codes)
- Bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-29183
Suggested Fix
Add animation elements to the sanitizer blocklist:
// In SanitizeSVG, line 250:
if tag == "script" || tag == "iframe" || tag == "object" || tag == "embed" ||
tag == "foreignobject" || tag == "animate" || tag == "set" ||
tag == "animatetransform" || tag == "animatemotion" {
n.RemoveChild(c)
c = next
continue
}Or additionally check the values, to, and from attributes for javascript: patterns:
if key == "values" || key == "to" || key == "from" {
if strings.Contains(val, "javascript:") {
continue
}
}Also consider checking attributeName — if it targets href, xlink:href, or any on* attribute, the animation element should be removed entirely.
Credited to 0xkakash1.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-60083
SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files
medium4.9Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-62204
SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin
medium6.6Oct 23, 2026CVE-2026-73049
SiYuan: The publish filter for database backlinks consults the forbidden list instead of the visibility list, disclosing hidden-tier documents to anonymous readers
medium5.8Oct 23, 2026CVE-2026-73054
SiYuan: A parser differential between the WebSocket keepalive exemption and the session quarantine allows unauthenticated access to the broadcast event stream
high7.5Oct 23, 2026CVE-2026-73630
SiYuan: authFilePublishAccess distinguishes hidden and forbidden documents from public and nonexistent ones, and issues a publish-auth cookie for documents it reports as forbidden
medium5.8Oct 23, 2026GHSA-xp3q-r38w-vgqm
SiYuan: The publish filter for local storage returns the administrator's entire storage map with only three keys sanitized
medium5.8Oct 23, 2026
