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AI agent vulnerability · Other MCP servers and tools

CVE-2026-60083: SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files

mediumCVSS 3.1 4.9GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34

SiYuan's built-in MCP `file` tool blocked only `conf/conf.json`, while the HTTP file API blocks four sensitive paths. An Administrator-level MCP caller could read `data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json`, which stores publish-mode passwords in plaintext. The Go module github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel is fixed at 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f.

Published Oct 27, 2026 · Analysis Nov 10, 2026

What an attacker can do

The MCP tool's resolvePath() in kernel/mcp/tools/file.go carried a comment saying its blocklist matched refuseToAccess() in kernel/api/file.go. It did not. The HTTP API refuses conf/conf.json, data/snippets/conf.json, everything under data/templates, and data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json. The MCP tool refused only the first. Its list, read, grep and find actions still worked on the other three.

The serious target is publishAccess.json. Each entry holds a password field in plaintext. Anyone who reads it can open every password-protected publish-mode share. The templates directory and snippet config are lower risk.

The attacker needs a valid Administrator-level session that can reach the MCP endpoint (CVSS PR:H). An earlier advisory, GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8, covered unauthenticated reach to /mcp, and it is fixed. This flaw is about what the tool exposes once reached. In practice, an AI agent or MCP client wired to SiYuan with admin credentials can be steered by a prompt injection to read these files and leak the passwords.

Who is affected

The advisory lists the Go module github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel at any version before 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f. Only installs with the MCP endpoint enabled and reachable are exposed in practice. Check your build:

go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

For a desktop or Docker install, compare the kernel build against the fix commit 3542530c505f.

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f
Fixed in
0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f
Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

How to fix it

Upgrade to the build containing commit 3542530c505f (module version 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f). The advisory also references the v3.8.0 release. The commit replaces the single conf.json check with the shared helper util.IsForbiddenAbsPath, which blocks all four paths, resolves symlinks, and compares case-insensitively on Windows and macOS.

go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/[email protected]

After upgrading, rotate any publish-mode passwords that an MCP client could have read. The advisory gives no other workaround.

How to tell if you were hit

Look for MCP file tool calls that read data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json, data/snippets/conf.json or paths under data/templates. Fixed builds return the error "access to sensitive workspace file is forbidden" for these, so that string in logs marks blocked attempts. On older builds, check which MCP clients held admin tokens. Beam records MCP tool calls made by AI agents, which shows whether an agent read these files.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

kernel/mcp/tools/file.go's resolvePath() includes an explicit comment stating its sensitive-path blocklist is meant to align with the HTTP file API's established blacklist (refuseToAccess() in kernel/api/file.go), following the remediation for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8 ("Unauthenticated Administrator takeover exfiltrated via the MCP"), which specifically recommended restricting this tool's scope. In practice, the MCP tool implements only 1 of the 4 static blocklist entries the HTTP API enforces.

Comparison

kernel/api/file.go refuseToAccess() blocks:

  1. conf/conf.json (API token, cookie signing key, accessAuthCode)
  2. data/snippets/conf.json
  3. the entire data/templates directory
  4. data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json
  5. (dynamic, per-request) any path the current publish-mode session isn't authorized for

kernel/mcp/tools/file.go resolvePath() blocks only:

confPath := filepath.Join(util.ConfDir, "conf.json")
if abs == confPath {
    return "", fmt.Errorf("access to conf.json is forbidden")
}

Items 2, 3, and 4 are absent. The tool's own list/read/grep/find actions remain fully functional against them.

Impact

An MCP client with access to the file tool (post-fix for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8, i.e. a properly authenticated Administrator-level caller) can read data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json directly:

type PublishAccessItem struct {
    ID       string `json:"id"`
    Visible  bool   `json:"visible"`
    Password string `json:"password"` // plaintext; empty string = no password
    Disable  bool   `json:"disable"`
}

This exposes the plaintext access password for every publish-mode-shared notebook/document, letting the reader bypass password protection on any publish-mode share. This is a serious sibling issue given the volume of publish-mode access-control bugs already reported against this codebase — the passwords protecting exactly that feature are directly readable through a tool whose own description says "never use for workspace data."

data/templates and data/snippets/conf.json are lower-severity but still inconsistent with the HTTP API's own precedent for what counts as sensitive.

Why this is a distinct finding, not a duplicate

GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8 was about *reachability* an unauthenticated Reader-tier JWT being forwarded to admin-scoped paths including /mcp. That has been fixed. This report is about the *tool's own scope* once reached by a legitimate, properly-authenticated caller, the remediation notes for that same advisory explicitly called for restricting resolvePath to WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log, which was not implemented; instead the tool retains workspace-wide scope with only a single-file blocklist addition.

Suggested fix

Either replicate the full refuseToAccess() blocklist in resolvePath() (minimum fix, keeps parity with the HTTP API going forward by extracting refuseToAccess's path list into a shared helper both call), or implement the originally-recommended allowlist restricting the tool to WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log for read and disabling write/delete/rename/copy entirely unless the caller is Administrator, matching the tool's own advertised "debugging/log reading only" scope.

Credited to alham-rizvi.

Questions

Does this need an authenticated user?

Yes. The caller must be a properly authenticated Administrator who can reach the MCP endpoint. The CVSS vector has PR:H. The unauthenticated path to /mcp was a separate issue, GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8.

What can an attacker actually read?

Mainly data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json, which holds plaintext publish-mode passwords. The templates directory and data/snippets/conf.json were also readable through the MCP file tool.

Is CVE-2026-60083 exploited in the wild?

No source says so. It is not in CISA's KEV catalog, and its EPSS score is 0.0039.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

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