CVE-2026-31809: SiYuan has a SVG Sanitizer Bypass via Whitespace in `javascript:` URI — Unauthenticated XSS
SVG Sanitizer Bypass via Whitespace in javascript: URI — Unauthenticated XSS Summary SiYuan's SVG sanitizer (SanitizeSVG) checks href attributes for the javascript: prefix using strings.HasPrefix(). However, inserting ASCII tab (	), newline ( ), or carriage return ( ) characters inside the javascript: string bypasses this prefix check.
Published Mar 10, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260310025236-297bd526708f
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260310025236-297bd526708f
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
SVG Sanitizer Bypass via Whitespace in javascript: URI — Unauthenticated XSS
Summary
SiYuan's SVG sanitizer (SanitizeSVG) checks href attributes for the javascript: prefix using strings.HasPrefix(). However, inserting ASCII tab (	), newline ( ), or carriage return ( ) characters inside the javascript: string bypasses this prefix check. Browsers strip these characters per the WHATWG URL specification before parsing the URL scheme, so the JavaScript still executes. This allows an attacker to inject executable JavaScript into the unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint, creating a reflected XSS.
This is a second bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-29183 (fixed in v3.5.9), distinct from the `<animate>` element bypass.
Affected Component
- File:
kernel/util/misc.go - Function:
SanitizeSVG()(lines 234-319) - Specific check: Line 271 —
strings.HasPrefix(val, "javascript:") - Endpoint:
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=...(unauthenticated) - Version: SiYuan <= 3.5.9
Root Cause
The sanitizer uses Go's html.Parse which decodes HTML entities in attribute values. When the input contains java	script:alert(1), the parser decodes 	 to a literal tab character (U+0009). The sanitizer then checks:
val := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(a.Val))
// val is now "java\tscript:alert(1)"
if strings.HasPrefix(val, "javascript:") {
continue // This check FAILS — tab breaks the prefix match
}strings.TrimSpace only removes leading/trailing whitespace, not internal whitespace. The HasPrefix check fails because "java\tscript:..." does not start with "javascript:".
However, per the WHATWG URL Standard, step 1 of URL parsing removes all ASCII tab and newline characters (U+0009, U+000A, U+000D) from the input. So the browser parses java\tscript:alert(1) as javascript:alert(1).
Proof of Concept
Vector 1: Tab character (	)
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text><text>&color=blueVector 2: Newline character ( )
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text><text>&color=blueVector 3: Carriage return ( )
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text><text>&color=blueVector 4: Multiple whitespace characters
GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text><text>&color=blueProcessing trace
- Input: ``
- html.Parse: Decodes entity → attribute value =
java\tscript:alert(document.domain) - Sanitizer:
TrimSpace(ToLower(val))=java\tscript:alert(document.domain)(tab preserved in middle) - HasPrefix check:
"java\tscript:..."does NOT start with"javascript:"→ passes through - html.Render: Outputs literal tab character in href (tabs are not HTML-special)
- Browser URL parser: Strips tab per WHATWG URL spec →
javascript:alert(document.domain) - User clicks link → JavaScript executes
Attack Scenario
Same as CVE-2026-29183 / advisory #01:
- Attacker crafts a malicious
getDynamicIconURL - Victim navigates to the URL (or is redirected)
- SVG renders with
Content-Type: image/svg+xml - Victim clicks the text link in the SVG
- JavaScript executes in SiYuan's origin
- Attacker steals session cookies, API tokens, or makes authenticated API calls
Impact
- Severity: CRITICAL (CVSS ~9.1)
- Type: CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation)
- Unauthenticated reflected XSS via SVG injection
- Executes in the SiYuan application origin
- Bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-29183
- Independent of the
<animate>element bypass (advisory #01) — different root cause
Suggested Fix
Replace the simple HasPrefix check with whitespace-stripped comparison:
// Strip ASCII tab, newline, CR before checking for javascript: prefix
cleaned := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if r == '\t' || r == '\n' || r == '\r' {
return -1 // Remove character
}
return r
}, val)
if key == "href" || key == "xlink:href" || key == "xlinkhref" {
if strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, "javascript:") {
continue
}
if strings.HasPrefix(cleaned, "data:") {
if strings.Contains(cleaned, "text/html") || strings.Contains(cleaned, "image/svg+xml") || strings.Contains(cleaned, "application/xhtml+xml") {
continue
}
}
}This should also be applied to the data: URI check, as the same whitespace bypass could potentially affect it.
Credited to 0xkakash1.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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