CVE-2026-32315: motionEye's World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash
Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye Summary motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system.
Published Jun 22, 2026
Affected packages
motioneye
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.44.0
- Fixed in
- 0.44.0
- Check
pip show motioneye
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye
Summary
motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.
Affected Versions
- motionEye <= 0.43.1b4
- Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies
0600mode tomotion.confandcamera-*.conffiles)
Vulnerability Details
World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)
When motionEye writes its configuration, the file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is created with 644 permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the @admin_password field:
# @admin_username admin
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.
Impact
The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:
- Offline password cracking: The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext admin password
- Authentication bypass: When combined with the signature authentication weakness (see GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), the hash can be used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests
- Full system compromise: When further chained with CVE-2025-60787 (OS command injection), a local unprivileged user can escalate to the Motion daemon user (often root)
Proof of Concept
The following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin's password:
# Verify the file permissions
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# Read the hash as an unprivileged user
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37Verified Output
The following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official motioneye_init method, admin password set to testpassword123):
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37The hash extracted by the unprivileged testuser matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.
Reproduction Steps
This vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.
Method 1: Manual Installation
- Install motionEye on a Linux system: ``
bash sudo pip install motioneye mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf``
- Set an admin password via the web UI at
http://localhost:8765
- Verify the config file is world-readable: ``
bash ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf``
- As an unprivileged user, read the hash: ``
bash sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37``
Method 2: Official motioneye_init Installation
- Install motionEye using the official init script: ``
bash sudo pip install motioneye sudo motioneye_init``
- The
motioneye_initscript automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI athttp://localhost:8765
- Verify the config file is still world-readable: ``
bash ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf``
Note that while the ownership changes to motion:motion (instead of root:root in the manual method), the permissions remain 644, meaning any local user can still read the file.
- Confirm as an unprivileged user: ``
bash sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf # @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37``
Both installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.
Related Vulnerabilities
- GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3: Password hash accepted as API signing key (CWE-836), which allows the hash exposed by this vulnerability to be used for forging authenticated admin API requests
- CVE-2025-60787: OS command injection via
image_file_name, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to root
Suggested Remediation
- Fix file permissions: Create
motion.confandcamera-*.confwith600permissions (-rw-------), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)
Timeline
- 2026-03-11: Vulnerability discovered during security research
- 2026-03-11: Vendor notified via GitHub Security Advisory
- 2026-03-12: Vendor acknowledged, confirmed fix in motionEye 0.44.0b1
Credited to dimashn04, 0xLynk, MichaIng.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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