CVE-2026-55488: motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read
Summary mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using os.path.join(). When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly.
Published Jun 23, 2026
Affected packages
motioneye
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.44.0
- Fixed in
- 0.44.0
- Check
pip show motioneye
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
mEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.
The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using os.path.join(). When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.
As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.
Details
The issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.
The filename parameter is passed to mediafiles.get_media_path():
def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):
target_dir = camera_config.get('target_dir')
full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)
return full_pathWhen path is an absolute path (e.g. /etc/motioneye/motion.conf), Python's os.path.join() discards target_dir entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (movie_playback.py lines 111-115):
def get_absolute_path(self, root, path):
return path
def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):
return absolute_pathThis allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access.
The same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers:
- GET /movie//download/
- GET /picture//download/
- GET /picture//preview/
PoC
GET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1
Host: target:8765Fix
Do not allow absolute paths supplied by user input.
Validate that the fully resolved canonical path remains within the configured camera media directory before serving a file.
Additionally, Tornado’s built-in path validation should not be bypassed unless equivalent validation is performed by motionEye.
Credited to pizza-power, sermikr0, C4spr0x1A, MichaIng, iaohkut-from-NightWolf-Team.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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