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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-40353: wger has Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields

mediumCVSS 4.0 5.1 · 3.1 5.4GHSA-6f54-qjvm-wwq3

Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields Summary The AbstractLicenseModel.attributionlink property in wger/utils/models.py constructs HTML strings by directly interpolating user-controlled fields (licenseauthor, licensetitle, licenseobjecturl, licenseauthorurl, licensederivativesourceurl) without any escaping.

Published Apr 16, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026

Affected packages

wger

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
<= 2.4
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
pip show wger

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields

Summary

The AbstractLicenseModel.attribution_link property in wger/utils/models.py constructs HTML strings by directly interpolating user-controlled fields (license_author, license_title, license_object_url, license_author_url, license_derivative_source_url) without any escaping. The resulting HTML is rendered in the ingredient view template using Django's |safe filter, which disables auto-escaping. An authenticated user can create an ingredient with a malicious license_author value containing JavaScript, which executes when any user (including unauthenticated visitors) views the ingredient page.

Severity

High (CVSS 3.1: ~7.6)

  • Low-privilege attacker (any authenticated non-temporary user)
  • Stored XSS — persists in database
  • Triggers on a public page (no authentication needed to view)
  • Can steal session cookies, perform actions as other users, redirect to phishing

CWE

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Affected Components

Vulnerable Property

File: wger/utils/models.py:88-110

@property
def attribution_link(self):
    out = ''
    if self.license_object_url:
        out += f'{self.license_title}'
    else:
        out += self.license_title  # NO ESCAPING
    out += ' by '
    if self.license_author_url:
        out += f'{self.license_author}'
    else:
        out += self.license_author  # NO ESCAPING
    out += f' is licensed under {self.license.short_name}'
    if self.license_derivative_source_url:
        out += (
            f'/ A derivative work from the '
            f'original work'
        )
    return out

Unsafe Template Rendering

File: wger/nutrition/templates/ingredient/view.html

  • Line 171: {{ ingredient.attribution_link|safe }}
  • Line 226: {{ image.attribution_link|safe }}

Writable Entry Point

File: wger/nutrition/views/ingredient.py:154-175

class IngredientCreateView(WgerFormMixin, CreateView):
    model = Ingredient
    form_class = IngredientForm  # includes license_author field

URL: login_required(ingredient.IngredientCreateView.as_view()) — any authenticated non-temporary user.

Form fields (from `wger/nutrition/forms.py:295-313`): includes license_author (TextField, max_length=3500) — no sanitization.

Models Affected

6 models inherit from AbstractLicenseModel:

  • Exercise, ExerciseImage, ExerciseVideo, Translation (exercises module)
  • Ingredient, Image (nutrition module)

Only the Ingredient and nutrition Image models' attribution links are currently rendered with |safe in templates.

Root Cause

  1. attribution_link constructs raw HTML by string interpolation of user-controlled fields without calling django.utils.html.escape() or django.utils.html.format_html()
  2. The template renders the result with |safe, bypassing Django's auto-escaping
  3. The license_author field in IngredientForm has no input sanitization
  4. The set_author() method only sets a default value if the field is empty — it does not sanitize user-provided values

Reproduction Steps (Verified)

Prerequisites

  • A wger instance with user registration enabled (default)
  • An authenticated user account (non-temporary)

Steps

  1. Register/login to a wger instance
  1. Create a malicious ingredient via the web form at /en/nutrition/ingredient/add/:
  2. Set Name to any valid name (e.g., "XSS Form Verified")
  3. Set Energy to 125, Protein to 10, Carbohydrates to 10, Fat to 5 (energy must approximately match macros)
  4. Set Author(s) (license_author) to: ```
   - Submit the form — **the form validates and saves successfully with no sanitization**

3. **View the ingredient page** (public URL, no auth needed):
   - Navigate to the newly created ingredient's detail page
   - The XSS payload executes in the browser

### Verified PoC Output

The rendered HTML in the ingredient detail page (line 171 of `ingredient/view.html`) contains:

by is licensed under CC-BY-SA 3


The `` tag with `onerror` handler is injected directly into the page DOM and executes JavaScript when the browser attempts to load the non-existent image.

### Alternative API Path (ExerciseImage)

For users who are "trustworthy" (account >3 weeks old + verified email):

Upload exercise image with XSS in license_author

curl -X POST https://wger.example.com/api/v2/exerciseimage/ \ -H "Authorization: Token " \ -F "exercise=1" \ -F "[email protected]" \ -F 'license_author=' \ -F "license=2"


Note: ExerciseImage's `attribution_link` is not currently rendered with `|safe` in exercise templates, but the data is stored with XSS payloads and would execute if any template renders it with `|safe` in the future. The API serializer also returns the unescaped `attribution_link` data, which could cause XSS in API consumers (mobile apps, SPAs).

## Impact

- **Session hijacking**: Steal admin session cookies to gain full control
- **Account takeover**: Modify other users' passwords or email addresses
- **Data theft**: Access other users' workout plans, nutrition data, and personal measurements
- **Worm-like propagation**: Malicious ingredient could inject XSS that creates more malicious ingredients
- **Phishing**: Redirect users to fake login pages

## Suggested Fix

Replace the `attribution_link` property with properly escaped HTML using Django's `format_html()`:

from django.utils.html import format_html, escape

@property def attribution_link(self): parts = []

if self.license_object_url: parts.append(format_html('{}', self.license_object_url, self.license_title)) else: parts.append(escape(self.license_title))

parts.append(' by ')

if self.license_author_url: parts.append(format_html('{}', self.license_author_url, self.license_author)) else: parts.append(escape(self.license_author))

parts.append(format_html( ' is licensed under {}', self.license.url, self.license.short_name ))

if self.license_derivative_source_url: parts.append(format_html( '/ A derivative work from the original work', self.license_derivative_source_url ))

return mark_safe(''.join(str(p) for p in parts))


Alternatively, remove the `|safe` filter from the templates and escape in the property, though this would break the anchor tags.

## References

- [Django Security: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) protection](https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/5.0/topics/security/#cross-site-scripting-xss-protection)
- [Django `format_html()` documentation](https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/5.0/ref/utils/#django.utils.html.format_html)
- [OWASP: Stored Cross-Site Scripting](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/#stored-xss-attacks)

Credited to 0xkakash1.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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