CVE-2026-40868: kyverno apicall servicecall implicit bearer token injection leaks kyverno serviceaccount token
kyverno’s apiCall servicecall helper implicitly injects Authorization: Bearer ... using the kyverno controller serviceaccount token when a policy does not explicitly set an Authorization header. because context.apiCall.service.url is policy-controlled, this can send the kyverno serviceaccount token to an attacker-controlled endpoint (confused deputy).
Published Apr 14, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/kyverno/kyverno
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.17.0
- Fixed in
- 1.17.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/kyverno/kyverno
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
kyverno’s apiCall servicecall helper implicitly injects Authorization: Bearer ... using the kyverno controller serviceaccount token when a policy does not explicitly set an Authorization header. because context.apiCall.service.url is policy-controlled, this can send the kyverno serviceaccount token to an attacker-controlled endpoint (confused deputy).
namespaced policies are blocked from servicecall usage by the namespaced urlPath gate in pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go, so this report is scoped to ClusterPolicy and global context usage.
attacker model
the attacker can create or update a ClusterPolicy (or create a GlobalContextEntry) which uses context.apiCall.service.url and can choose the request URL and headers. a cross-boundary framing for real deployments is gitops: if the policy repo/controller is compromised, the ClusterPolicy/global context entry becomes untrusted input to kyverno.
relevant links
- repository: https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno
- commit: 17aeb52337fd66adb0c8126213ba076612a287a7
- callsite (token injection): https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/blob/17aeb52337fd66adb0c8126213ba076612a287a7/pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go#L150-L173
- namespaced policy gate (servicecall blocked): https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/blob/17aeb52337fd66adb0c8126213ba076612a287a7/pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go#L67-L83
root cause
in (*executor).addHTTPHeaders, kyverno reads the serviceaccount token from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token and injects it when the outgoing request has no Authorization header:
if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
token := a.getToken()
if token != "" {
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
}proof of concept
the attached poc.zip is a reproducible cluster PoC. it uses an in-cluster HTTP receiver which logs the Authorization header it receives. the PoC does not print token bytes; it only checks that the received header is non-empty and not equal to the negative control.
run (one command):
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make testcanonical (expected: implicit token injection):
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonicalexpected output includes:
[CALLSITE_HIT]: executor.addHTTPHeaders Authorization=="" -> read_serviceaccount_token=true
[PROOF_MARKER]: authorization_header_injected=true token_nonempty=truecontrol (expected: explicit Authorization header disables auto-injection):
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make controlexpected output includes:
[CALLSITE_HIT]: executor.addHTTPHeaders Authorization!="" -> autoinject_skipped=true
[NC_MARKER]: authorization_header_injected=falseoptional: the canonical run may also print an [RBAC]: ... line using kubectl auth can-i with the exfiltrated token, to show concrete privileges without exposing the token.
impact
token exfiltration: the kyverno controller serviceaccount token is sent to a policy-controlled endpoint. impact depends on the rbac bound to that serviceaccount in the target deployment.
recommended fix
do not auto-inject the kyverno serviceaccount token into policy-controlled servicecall requests. require explicit Authorization configuration, or enforce a strict allowlist of destinations where credentials may be attached and document the behavior.
workarounds
- avoid using servicecall to arbitrary urls in policies.
- set an explicit Authorization header in servicecall policies to prevent implicit token injection.
oleh
Credited to 1seal, copethomas, sublimino.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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