CVE-2026-44551: Open WebUI has an LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass
Open WebUI 0.8.12 and earlier lets anyone log in as any known LDAP user by sending an empty password, when LDAP login is enabled and the LDAP server accepts unauthenticated simple binds. Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0.
Published May 8, 2026 · Updated Nov 16, 2026 · Analysis Oct 27, 2026
What an attacker can do
The LDAP login route POST /api/v1/auths/ldap takes a user and password. The LdapForm model in models/auths.py sets no minimum length on password, so an empty string is accepted. In routers/auths.py the app binds to the LDAP server with the target's DN and that empty password. RFC 4513 calls this an unauthenticated simple bind, and many servers (OpenLDAP in its default setup, some Active Directory configurations) answer with success. Open WebUI then treats the login as valid and issues a full session token.
The attacker needs the name of a valid LDAP user and network access to Open WebUI. Admin accounts that sign in through LDAP are included. The attacker gets the victim's chats, files, API keys and settings, and can act as them. The advisory also notes the LDAP endpoint has no rate limiting, unlike the password sign-in route.
Two conditions must hold: ENABLE_LDAP=True (off by default) and an LDAP server that allows empty-password binds.
Who is affected
Affected: open-webui and the openwebui/open-webui Docker image at 0.8.12 and earlier, only with LDAP authentication on. Check the version and setting:
pip show open-webuiThen confirm whether ENABLE_LDAP is true in your environment, and whether your LDAP server accepts unauthenticated simple binds.
open-webui
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.8.12
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
- Check
pip show open-webui
How to fix it
Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0 or later, for pip or Docker:
pip install --upgrade open-webuiThe advisory does not describe the code change. It gives no official workaround. Two things reduce risk: turn off LDAP login until you upgrade, and configure the LDAP server to reject unauthenticated binds. These follow from the preconditions, not from the advisory's own advice.
How to tell if you were hit
Review Open WebUI request logs for POST /api/v1/auths/ldap with an empty password field, and for successful LDAP logins with no matching password bind in directory logs. On the LDAP server, look for simple bind operations with a DN and zero-length password that returned resultCode 0. Check recent sessions for admin accounts you did not expect.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
LDAP Empty Password Authentication Bypass
Affected Component
LDAP authentication endpoint:
backend/open_webui/routers/auths.py(lines 468-477, user bind with empty password)backend/open_webui/models/auths.py(lines 58-60,LdapFormmodel)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with LDAP authentication support.
Description
The LDAP authentication endpoint does not validate that the submitted password is non-empty before performing a Simple Bind against the LDAP server. Per RFC 4513 Section 5.1.2, a Simple Bind with a valid DN and an empty password constitutes an "unauthenticated simple authentication" — many LDAP servers (including OpenLDAP in default configuration and some Active Directory setups) return success (resultCode 0) for this operation.
The LdapForm Pydantic model accepts password: str with no minimum length constraint, so an empty string passes validation. The subsequent Connection.bind() call succeeds on vulnerable LDAP servers, and the application issues a full session token for the target user.
# models/auths.py:58-60 — no min_length on password
class LdapForm(BaseModel):
user: str
password: str
# auths.py:469-477 — empty password reaches LDAP bind
connection_user = Connection(
server,
user_dn,
form_data.password, # can be ""
auto_bind='NONE',
authentication='SIMPLE',
)
if not await asyncio.to_thread(connection_user.bind):
raise HTTPException(400, 'Authentication failed.')
# If bind succeeds (which it does with empty password on many servers),
# execution continues and a full session token is issuedCVSS 3.1 Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Rationale | | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via the LDAP login endpoint | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | Single request with an empty password field | | Privileges Required | None (N) | No prior authentication needed | | User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact within the application's authentication boundary | | Confidentiality | High (H) | Full access to victim's account data — chats, files, API keys, settings | | Integrity | High (H) | Can modify victim's data, settings, send messages as victim | | Availability | None (N) | No direct denial of service |
Attack Scenario
- LDAP authentication is enabled on the Open WebUI instance.
- The underlying LDAP server accepts unauthenticated simple binds (OpenLDAP default, some AD configs).
- Attacker sends: ``
POST /api/v1/auths/ldap {"user": "admin_username", "password": ""}`` - The app DN bind succeeds normally (line 366), finds the target user via LDAP search.
- The user bind (line 469-477) sends a Simple Bind with the target's DN and an empty password.
- The LDAP server returns success for the unauthenticated bind.
authenticate_user_by_email(line 507) issues a full session token for the target user.- Attacker has complete access to the victim's account.
Impact
- Complete authentication bypass — any LDAP user account can be taken over without knowing the password
- Includes admin accounts if they authenticate via LDAP
- No rate limiting on the LDAP endpoint (unlike the password signin endpoint)
- Zero interaction required from the victim
Preconditions
- LDAP must be enabled (
ENABLE_LDAP=True, disabled by default) - The LDAP server must accept unauthenticated simple binds with empty passwords (OpenLDAP default behavior, configurable on AD)
- Attacker must know a valid LDAP username
Credited to Classic298.
Questions
- Is LDAP enabled by default in Open WebUI?
No. The advisory says ENABLE_LDAP is off by default. Only instances that turned LDAP login on are exposed.
- Does my LDAP server matter?
Yes. The bypass only works if the directory accepts an unauthenticated simple bind with an empty password. The advisory names the OpenLDAP default and some Active Directory setups.
- What does the attacker need to know?
A valid LDAP username. No password and no prior session is needed.
- Which version fixes it?
open-webui 0.9.0. Version 0.8.12 and earlier are affected.
References
Read for this analysis:
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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