CVE-2026-45349: Open WebUI has Broken Access Control for Completions API
In Open WebUI 0.8.12 and earlier, /api/chat/completions does not check that the chat ID belongs to the caller. Any user with their own API key and another user's chat ID can continue that user's conversation and see its content. Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0.
Published May 14, 2026 · Updated May 15, 2026 · Analysis Oct 27, 2026
What an attacker can do
The chat_completion handler accepted a chat_id and loaded that chat without comparing its owner to the requesting user. A user generates an API key in their settings, then calls /api/chat/completions with someone else's chat ID. The model answers inside the other user's conversation, which exposes earlier messages and lets the caller add new ones to it. The advisory notes both users need access to the same model, which is common with a shared pipeline model.
The chat ID is not secret. It appears in the chat's URL, so it leaks through screenshots, shared links, browser history and logs. Anyone who sees one, plus a standard account, can read and write into that conversation. The advisory rates this as a large impact on any user, since private information in chats becomes readable. The proof of concept used v0.6.18. The commit that fixes it adds Chats.is_chat_owner(chat_id, user.id) and returns 404 to non-owners. Admins keep access, as designed.
Who is affected
The pip package open-webui at 0.8.12 and earlier. Users on 0.9.0 or later are not affected. Risk is highest on shared instances where people see each other's chat URLs. Check the version:
pip show open-webuiFor Docker, check the image tag.
open-webui
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.8.12
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
- Check
pip show open-webui
How to fix it
Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0:
pip install --upgrade open-webuiThe fix is commit cf4218e688def6f11d195aeda6665ae5b5376b67. For requests that target an existing chat, the handler checks ownership and returns 404 to non-owners. New chats are unaffected. The sources give no workaround.
How to tell if you were hit
Look in API logs for POST /api/chat/completions requests where the chat_id belongs to a different user than the API key's owner. Open WebUI's database ties each chat to a user_id, so you can join the two. Look for chats with messages that the owner does not recognise, or with turns added through API calls. Treat chat URLs that were posted in public places as exposed.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Any user X can continue the conversation of any other user Y, as long as the Chat ID of Y is known. User X does not even need to be an admin to do so.
Details
A user just needs to use the API endpoint: /api/chat/completions with their own API key (generated in OWUI) and the Chat ID of another user. OWUI does not check to match the Chat ID with the user that created that Chat ID. Note that both users will need access to the same model. This is especially relevant if there is a shared pipeline model between users.
PoC
- Using OWUI v0.6.18
- Sign in with any user
X - Generate an API Key for user
Xusing the settings - Create another user
Y, and have a conversation in OWUI. Copy the Chat ID from the URL. - User
Xcan now use the API/api/chat/completionsand the Chat ID from step 4 to continue the conversation of userY
Impact
Large impact to any user in OWUI. People can read your conversations, and access private information if they know your Chat ID (which is in the URL of the chat).
Resolution
Fixed in commit cf4218e68, first released in v0.9.0 (Apr 2026). The chat_completion handler at backend/open_webui/main.py:1868 now explicitly verifies chat ownership via Chats.is_chat_owner(chat_id, user.id) for any request that targets an existing chat, and raises 404 for non-owners (admin bypass preserved per the documented threat model). New chats (no chat_id supplied, or freshly inserted via the is_new_chat branch) are unaffected. Users on >= 0.9.0 are not affected.
Credited to savvaki, Classic298.
Questions
- What does an attacker need for CVE-2026-45349?
A normal account with an API key, the victim's chat ID, and access to the same model as the victim. No admin rights are needed.
- How would an attacker get a chat ID?
It is in the chat's URL. Shared screenshots, logs or browser history can reveal it.
- Is 0.9.0 fully fixed?
The advisory says users on 0.9.0 or later are not affected, because the handler now checks chat ownership for existing chats.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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