CVE-2026-46617: Fission runtime pods automount the fission-fetcher service-account token into the user function container, granting function code namespace-wide secret / configmap read
Summary Fission runtime pods were created with ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher, and the fission-fetcher ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide get on secrets and configmaps (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config).
Published May 21, 2026 · Updated Jun 10, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/fission/fission
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.22.0
- Fixed in
- 1.23.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/fission/fission
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Fission runtime pods were created with ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher, and the fission-fetcher ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide get on secrets and configmaps (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod's automounted token was reachable from inside the user's function container at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function's namespace — far beyond the Function.spec.secrets allowlist that the function specification suggests.
Affected component
pkg/executor/executortype/poolmgr/gp_deployment.go:154-156— pool-manager runtime podServiceAccountName.pkg/executor/executortype/newdeploy/newdeploy.go:225-227— new-deploy runtime podServiceAccountName.pkg/utils/serviceaccount.go:51-64—fission-fetcherRBAC: namespace-widegetonsecrets/configmaps.
Impact
A user able to deploy or update a function in any namespace where Fission runtime pods are scheduled could:
- Read every secret in that namespace (TLS keys, OIDC client secrets, database credentials, cloud provider credentials).
- Read every configmap in that namespace.
- Use those credentials to pivot to other Kubernetes resources or external systems the secrets unlock.
This violates the principle that Function.spec.secrets is the authoritative declaration of which secrets a function can read.
Root cause
The fetcher sidecar legitimately needs the SA token to call the Fission control plane and fetch package archives. Setting ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher on the pod gives every container in the pod (including the user container) the automounted token. Kubernetes does not provide per-container service-account scoping inside a single pod, so the user container has to be moved into a separate identity / token-mount scheme.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
- PR #3366 (commit
fe1842ef): - The user function container now sets
AutomountServiceAccountToken: falseat the container level (via projected-volume token suppression), so the user container no longer sees the pod's SA token even though the fetcher sidecar still does. - The fetcher sidecar retains its existing token mount (separate projected volume) since it needs cluster API access for its own work.
- For the few legitimate use cases where a function needs its own Kubernetes API access, the user is expected to mount a different ServiceAccount via
Function.spec.podspecwith the minimum necessary RBAC (documented separately).
Mitigation (until upgrade)
- Restrict who can create / update
FunctionandPackageCRDs in your cluster — treat the ability to ship function code as equivalent to namespace-wide secret read. - Reduce the
fission-fetcherClusterRole / Role scope where possible (e.g. constrain it to specific named secrets via separate Role bindings). - Add NetworkPolicy egress rules denying function pods access to the Kubernetes API server (this blunts the token even if it leaks).
Credited to FORIMOC, nnin-nnin, sanketsudake.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-50567
Fission: Zip Slip in pkg/utils/zip.go:Unarchive allows fetcher to write outside the destination directory
high7.7Jul 28, 2026CVE-2026-50568
Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape
low3.6Jul 28, 2026CVE-2026-50569
Fission: HTTPTrigger admission omits RelativeURL / Prefix validation; kubectl apply bypasses CLI checks
medium4.3Jul 28, 2026CVE-2026-50570
Fission: Incomplete capability denylist in Environment/Function PodSpec validation allows tenant-added CAP_SYS_TIME and cross-tenant node wall-clock corruption
high8.5Jul 28, 2026CVE-2026-49821
Fission: Cross-namespace Environment reference in Package allows build-time command execution and SA token exfiltration
high7.7Jun 30, 2026CVE-2026-49822
Fission: Cross-namespace event leakage via KubernetesWatchTrigger allows persistent tenant surveillance
high7.7Jun 30, 2026
