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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-47249: Klever-Go KVM: Hash-array amplification in P2P resolver request handling

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-w342-mj6g-v9c4

Summary A connected peer can send a compressed RequestDataTypeHashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. On klever-go v1.7.17, this allows remote memory and CPU amplification against nodes that accept P2P peer connections.

Published Jun 5, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 1.7.18
Fixed in
1.7.18
Check
go list -m github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A connected peer can send a compressed RequestDataType_HashArrayType direct request that is only 442 bytes on the wire but expands into 200000 decoded hash entries inside the resolver path. On klever-go v1.7.17, this allows remote memory and CPU amplification against nodes that accept P2P peer connections.

Details

Resolver antiflood logic accounts only one logical message and the compressed wire size in data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30.

Batch.Decompress() in data/batch/batch.go#L122 enforces an inflated byte cap but does not enforce a decoded repeated-field item cap. After decompression, TxResolver preallocates and iterates all decoded hashes in data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194, and TrieNodeResolver iterates the same unchecked decoded set in data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108.

Pinned references:

  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/messageProcessor.go#L30
  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/batch/batch.go#L122
  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/transactionResolver.go#L194
  • https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/blob/333f6ec910906e227705fc5767dc897d8fbfc862/data/retriever/resolvers/trieNodeResolver.go#L108

This appears distinct from the public CVE-2026-44697 / GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v, which covered MultiDataInterceptor compressed batch fan-in. This report concerns resolver request paths that remain reachable through real libp2p direct-send plumbing on v1.7.17.

PoC

Reproduced with:

go run auditpoc/request_batch_hash_amplification_poc.go
go test github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc -run TestRequestBatchHashAmplification_DirectSendReachability -count=1

Observed output:

request wire bytes: 442
fits direct-send limit (983040 bytes): true
tx resolver lookups: 200000
trie resolver lookups: 200000
heap delta before first tx lookup: 17.47 MiB
ok   github.com/klever-io/klever-go/auditpoc

The E2E harness registers the victim resolver on the request topic and sends the malicious payload through SendToConnectedPeer() to prove the work amplification survives the real direct-send path.

Impact

A connected peer can convert a sub-kilobyte request into large decode-time memory pressure and synchronous CPU work on the target node. Repeated requests or several concurrent peers can degrade or exhaust validator resources, affecting node availability.

Credited to leduckhuong.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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