CVE-2026-47409: praisonai-platform: Missing authorization on member removal enables full workspace takeover by any user regardless of role
Summary Type: Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The DELETE /workspaces/{workspaceid}/members/{userid} endpoint is gated only by requireworkspacemember(workspaceid) (default minrole="member"). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard.
Published May 29, 2026
Affected packages
praisonai-platform
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.1.2
- Fixed in
- 0.1.4
- Check
pip show praisonai-platform
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Type: Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id} endpoint is gated only by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) (default min_role="member"). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 130-140; services/member_service.py, lines 71-78. Root cause: MemberService.remove(workspace_id, user_id) performs the deletion without any caller-permission check or owner-protection logic. The route accepts the URL-supplied user_id and dispatches it straight through. The role hierarchy (MemberService.has_role) is implemented but never invoked here. A member-tier attacker can issue DELETE .../members/<owner_user_id> and immediately lock the legitimate owner out of the workspace.
Affected Code
File 1: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 130-140.
@router.delete("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def remove_member(
workspace_id: str,
user_id: str,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id) # <-- removes any member, including owner
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Member not found")File 2: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py, lines 71-78.
async def remove(self, workspace_id: str, user_id: str) -> bool:
"""Remove a member from a workspace."""
member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
if member is None:
return False
await self._session.delete(member) # <-- BUG: no caller-role check, no last-owner protection
await self._session.flush()
return TrueWhy it's wrong: member-removal is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. Removing the workspace owner is a permanent denial-of-service against the legitimate owner unless another owner exists. There must be (a) a caller min-role gate of "owner" or "admin", (b) a check that prevents removing a member whose role is higher than the caller's, and (c) a check that the workspace is left with at least one owner. None of these exist.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker is a member of workspace
Wwith role "member". State: attacker holds JWT. - Attacker enumerates the workspace owner's
user_idviaGET /workspaces/W/members(list_members has the same default-member gate, separate finding). Owner UUIDO_idis now known. State: attacker holdsO_id. - Attacker sends
DELETE /workspaces/W/members/O_idwithAuthorization: Bearer <attacker_jwt>. State: control flow entersremove_member. require_workspace_member(W, attacker)passes (attacker is a member).MemberService.remove(W, O_id)deletes the owner's member row. State:Member(workspace_id=W, user_id=O_id, role="owner")is gone.- Owner attempts
GET /workspaces/W/...andrequire_workspace_member(W, O_id)returns 403. State: legitimate owner is now locked out of their own workspace. - Combined with the
update_member_rolecompanion advisory, the attacker first promotes themselves to owner, then removes the legitimate owner, then has uncontested control. Combined withdelete_workspace, the attacker wipes the workspace after kicking the owner. - Final state: with one member-level token, the attacker locks the legitimate owner out of their own workspace permanently. The owner has no recourse other than database-level admin intervention.
Security Impact
Severity: sec-high. CVSS 8.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, no confidentiality, high integrity (membership table corrupted), high availability (legitimate owner cannot access their own workspace). Attacker capability: with one workspace-member token plus one DELETE request, the attacker permanently locks any other member (including the workspace owner) out of the workspace. Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any membership token; owner's user_id is reachable via the (unauthenticated-for-member) list_members endpoint. Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between require_workspace_member's tunable min_role parameter and this endpoint's use of the default value confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, member-tier tokens fail the gate, and removing the workspace's last owner triggers the additional guard.
Suggested Fix
--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
@@ -130,11 +130,21 @@
@router.delete("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def remove_member(
workspace_id: str,
user_id: str,
- user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+ user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
+ target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)
+ if target is not None and target.role == "owner":
+ # Refuse to remove the last owner.
+ owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == "owner"]
+ if len(owners) <= 1:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Cannot remove the last workspace owner")
removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Member not found")The four companion workspace-mutation endpoints exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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