GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x: praisonai-platform: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Summary The issue create and update endpoints in praisonai-platform accept a projectid in the request body and persist it without validating that the project belongs to the URL workspace. A user who is a member of workspace WB (and has no access to workspace WA) can create issues that reference a project owned by WA.
Published Jun 18, 2026
Affected packages
praisonai-platform
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.1.8
- Fixed in
- 0.1.8
- Check
pip show praisonai-platform
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The issue create and update endpoints in praisonai-platform accept a project_id in the request body and persist it without validating that the project belongs to the URL workspace. A user who is a member of workspace W_B (and has no access to workspace W_A) can create issues that reference a project owned by W_A. Because ProjectService.get_stats() aggregates issues by project_id with no workspace constraint, those foreign issues are then counted in the victim's own legitimate view of their project statistics. This is a cross-tenant integrity violation reachable by an outsider.
This is distinct from the path-parameter IDOR family fixed in 0.1.4 (CVE-2026-47415, CVE-2026-47418, CVE-2026-47419). Those fixes scoped object references supplied in the URL path. This report concerns an object reference supplied in the request body at write time, which the 0.1.4 fixes did not cover.
Version 0.1.4 fixed a set of path-parameter IDORs by threading workspace_id into the service-layer lookups (get / update / delete) and by adding the helpers ensure_resource_in_workspace() and require_issue_in_workspace() in api/deps.py. Those helpers are applied to object references that arrive in the URL path. They are not applied to object references that arrive in the request body on create or update.
Details
api/routes/issues.py, create_issue passes the body's project_id straight through with no workspace validation:
@router.post("/", response_model=IssueResponse, status_code=201)
async def create_issue(workspace_id: str, body: IssueCreate,
user=Depends(require_workspace_member), session=Depends(get_db)):
svc = IssueService(session)
issue = await svc.create(
workspace_id=workspace_id,
title=body.title,
creator_id=user.id,
project_id=body.project_id, # attacker-controlled, not validated against workspace_id
...
)services/issue_service.py, create persists it as-is:
issue = Issue(
workspace_id=workspace_id,
project_id=project_id, # no check that project_id belongs to workspace_id
...
)services/issue_service.py, update has the identical gap on the update path:
if project_id is not None:
issue.project_id = project_id # re-parent to any project, no workspace checkservices/project_service.py, get_stats aggregates by project_id only:
async def get_stats(self, project_id: str) -> dict:
stmt = (
select(Issue.status, func.count(Issue.id))
.where(Issue.project_id == project_id) # no workspace_id constraint
.group_by(Issue.status)
)
...Note that the read path is not directly vulnerable. The stats route scopes the project first, so a cross-workspace stats read returns 404:
@router.get("/{project_id}/stats")
async def project_stats(workspace_id, project_id, user=Depends(require_workspace_member), ...):
project = await svc.get(project_id, workspace_id=workspace_id) # 404 for a foreign project
if project is None:
raise HTTPException(404, "Project not found")
return await svc.get_stats(project_id)The pollution therefore enters through the write side (issue create/update accepting a foreign project_id) and surfaces in the victim's own legitimate read of their project statistics.
Proof of concept
Two unrelated users:
- Alice, member of workspace
W_A, owns projectP_A. - Bob, member of workspace
W_Bonly. Bob has no access toW_A(every direct call toW_Aresources returns 403).
Steps:
- Alice's project
P_Ahas one in-progress issue.GET /workspaces/W_A/projects/P_A/statsreturns{"total": 1, "by_status": {"in_progress": 1}}.
- Bob creates issues in his own workspace that reference Alice's project. Repeat 7 times: ```http POST /workspaces/W_B/issues Authorization: Bearer Content-Type: application/json
{"title": "x", "project_id": "P_A", "status": "done"}
Each returns 201. Each issue is stored with `workspace_id = W_B` and `project_id = P_A`.
3. Alice reads her own project stats:
`GET /workspaces/W_A/projects/P_A/stats` now returns
`{"total": 8, "by_status": {"done": 7, "in_progress": 1}}`.
Bob is not a member of `W_A`, yet data he wrote appears in Alice's project dashboard.
## Impact
An unauthorized outsider can inflate or skew the issue counts shown in any workspace's project-statistics view, given only the target `project_id` (a UUID that can be harvested or guessed). The effect is limited to the statistics aggregation; it does not expose the victim's issue contents to the attacker and does not appear in the victim's workspace-scoped issue list. The same unvalidated write path also accepts cross-workspace `parent_issue_id` and `assignee_id` values, which have no aggregation read endpoint today but represent the same dangling cross-workspace reference class and should be fixed together.
## Suggested fix
On both issue create and update, validate that any body-supplied object reference resolves within the URL workspace before persisting, reusing the existing pattern:
if body.project_id is not None: project = await ProjectService(session).get(body.project_id, workspace_id=workspace_id) if project is None: raise HTTPException(404, "Project not found")
Apply the same check to `parent_issue_id` (via `require_issue_in_workspace`) and to `assignee_id`. As defense in depth, scope `get_stats` so it only counts issues whose `workspace_id` matches the project's workspace.Credited to sai-sh.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-61440
PraisonAI: Platform members can rewrite shared labels and owner issue labels without owner/admin authorization
medium6.5Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-61442
PraisonAI: Platform member PATCH routes allow owner resource rewrites and project lead reassignment delete bypass
high7.1Oct 8, 2026CVE-2026-62179
PraisonAI: Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues
medium6.5Oct 7, 2026CVE-2026-57121
PraisonAI: Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others' content in Platform API
high8.1Jun 18, 2026CVE-2026-57147
praisonai-platform: default JWT signing secret 'dev-secret-change-me' enables token forgery
critical9.8Jun 18, 2026CVE-2026-57148
praisonai-platform 0.1.4 still boots on the hardcoded JWT secret dev-secret-change-me (default-open production guard)
critical9.8Jun 18, 2026
