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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-47735: Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks

highCVSS 4.0 7.1GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5

Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only readparquet( and arcpartitionagg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — readcsvauto, readcsv, readjson, readjsonauto, readtext, readblob, glob, parquetmetadata, parquetschema, readxlsx, etc. — was not blocked.

Published Jun 8, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/basekick-labs/arc

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
Fixed in
0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
Check
go list -m github.com/basekick-labs/arc

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.

Impact

Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:

POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}

Confirmed reachable targets:

  • auth.db — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.
  • arc.toml — S3 secrets, TLS keys.
  • /proc/self/environ — environment-variable secrets.
  • Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
  • SSRF when httpfs is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...') reaches instance metadata IPs.

Patches

Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:

  1. SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...] enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).
  2. SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false (one-way at runtime).
  3. Verified by reading back the flag.

After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.

Workarounds

  • Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
  • Temporary mitigation: add read_csv*/read_json*/glob etc. to dangerousSQLPattern in internal/api/query.go pending 2026.06.1.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Credited to NeuroWinter.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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