CVE-2026-47735: Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks
Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only readparquet( and arcpartitionagg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — readcsvauto, readcsv, readjson, readjsonauto, readtext, readblob, glob, parquetmetadata, parquetschema, readxlsx, etc. — was not blocked.
Published Jun 8, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/basekick-labs/arc
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02
- Check
go list -m github.com/basekick-labs/arc
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.
Impact
Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:
POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}Confirmed reachable targets:
auth.db— bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.arc.toml— S3 secrets, TLS keys./proc/self/environ— environment-variable secrets.- Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
- SSRF when
httpfsis loaded (any S3-backed deployment) —read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')reaches instance metadata IPs.
Patches
Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:
SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false(one-way at runtime).- Verified by reading back the flag.
After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.
Workarounds
- Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
- Temporary mitigation: add
read_csv*/read_json*/globetc. todangerousSQLPatternininternal/api/query.gopending 2026.06.1.
Credits
Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.
Credited to NeuroWinter.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesCVE-2026-55098
Arc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735
medium6.5Nov 4, 2026GHSA-m3qr-fvp4-78xj
Arc has unauthenticated application log disclosure via `/api/v1/logs`
lowNov 3, 2026CVE-2026-55678
arc has unauthenticated cluster node admission when `cluster.shared_secret` is unset
medium6.9Aug 28, 2026CVE-2026-48050
Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS
high8.8Jun 11, 2026
