CVE-2026-50008: parse-server: Server option routeAllowList is bypassable through batch sub-requests
Impact The routeAllowList server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the /batch handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check.
Published Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
parse-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 9.8.0, < 9.9.1-alpha.3
- Fixed in
- 9.9.1-alpha.3
- Check
npm ls parse-server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
The routeAllowList server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the /batch handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches batch can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list.
Authentication, ACL, CLP, and other inner-route authorization controls still apply — only the operator-configured route firewall is bypassed.
Patches
routeAllowList is now re-enforced for each batch sub-request inside the batch handler before dispatch, mirroring the existing per-sub-request rate-limit enforcement pattern. The path-normalization and regex-match logic was extracted into a shared helper used by both the outer middleware and the batch handler. Master and maintenance keys bypass the per-sub-request check on the same terms as the outer middleware.
Workarounds
Operators who use routeAllowList and have allowlisted batch can mitigate without upgrading by explicitly including every inner route they intend to allow via batch in the allow-list (for example, routeAllowList: ['batch', 'classes/Public.*', 'functions/allowedFunction']). This approach makes those inner routes reachable as direct REST requests as well, so it is broader than the post-patch behavior, but it eliminates the bypass.
Operators who do not configure routeAllowList are not affected. Parse Server v8 LTS is not affected because routeAllowList was introduced in v9.8.0.
Credited to offset, mtrezza.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesCVE-2026-61448
Parse Server vulnerable to stored XSS via malformed Content-Type bypassing file upload extension blocklist
low2.1Oct 29, 2026CVE-2026-53724
parse-server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist
low2.1Jun 19, 2026CVE-2026-53725
parse-server: Endpoints `/login` and `/verifyPassword` disclose MFA secrets and protected fields when `_User` get is denied
medium5.9Jun 19, 2026CVE-2026-53726
parse-server: Relation `$relatedTo` query bypasses `protectedFields` and owning-object ACL
medium6.9Jun 19, 2026CVE-2026-55778
parse-server: Stored XSS via non-standard file extension bypassing file upload extension blocklist
low2.1Jun 19, 2026GHSA-97pr-9hgg-3p8r
parse-server: LiveQuery discloses object data to a subscriber across an ACL read-access change
low2.3Jun 19, 2026
