CVE-2026-53724: parse-server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist
Impact The default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged.
Published Jun 19, 2026
Affected packages
parse-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 9.0.0, < 9.9.1-alpha.4
- Fixed in
- 9.9.1-alpha.4
- Check
npm ls parse-server
parse-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 8.6.78
- Fixed in
- 8.6.79
- Check
npm ls parse-server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
The default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses.
Patches
A filename ending in a dot is now treated as extensionless. When the parser produces an empty extension, the request handler falls back to validating the Content-Type subtype against the configured extension blocklist, matching the path that already catches truly extensionless uploads with a dangerous Content-Type. This is a follow-up to the previous fix GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc.
Workarounds
Configure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type, or replace the default blocklist with an explicit allowlist of needed file extensions.
Credited to offset, mtrezza.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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