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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

CVE-2026-62677: Omnigent: Unvalidated os_env.cwd in agent bundle yields arbitrary host filesystem access on runners without OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE

highCVSS 3.1 8.8GHSA-p8rw-8qj3-hf33

Summary An authenticated, non-admin user can obtain arbitrary host-filesystem read/write (and host environment-secret disclosure) on an Omnigent runner by uploading an agent bundle whose osenv.cwd points outside any intended workspace (e.g. / or /home/ ). The cwd field is taken verbatim from the bundle with no validation, normalization, or boundary check anywhere in the spec pipeline.

Published Sep 2, 2026

Affected packages

omnigent

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
< 0.3.0
Fixed in
0.3.0
Check
pip show omnigent

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

An authenticated, non-admin user can obtain arbitrary host-filesystem read/write (and host environment-secret disclosure) on an Omnigent runner by uploading an agent bundle whose os_env.cwd points outside any intended workspace (e.g. / or /home/<victim>). The cwd field is taken verbatim from the bundle with no validation, normalization, or boundary check anywhere in the spec pipeline.

This is a different sink from GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h (CWE-94, shared-agent bundle overwrite -> stdio MCP RCE). It shares the bundle-upload *vector* but is reached through the user's own session-scoped agent and is not addressed by that advisory's proposed shared-agent guard.

Preconditions

  • Runner realizes a session-scoped uploaded bundle without OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE set. When that env var is set (CLI- and host-launched sessions set it), the spec cwd is overridden and the attack is neutralized — so this is deployment-gated, not universal.
  • Attacker is any authenticated user (no admin scope; _require_user only checks identity). No shared-agent overwrite needed.

Details (verified against code)

  1. Parse — no validation. omnigent/spec/parser.py:696 stores cwd=str(cwd_raw) verbatim. Absolute paths (/, /etc), ../.., etc. are all accepted. The sandbox.type is likewise author-chosen and "none" is legal.
  2. Validate — cwd unconstrained. omnigent/spec/validator.py _validate_os_env checks only fork/scratch/egress combinations; it never references cwd (the sole mention, line ~526, is a comment). No boundary is applied to the cwd itself. The boundary in server/schemas.py validates a *caller-supplied workspace against* the spec cwd (treating the author cwd as trusted) and only for host-launched sessions — it does not bound the cwd.
  3. Sink. omnigent/inner/os_env.py:890 sets cwd = Path(spec.cwd or os.getcwd()).resolve(strict=False) as the environment root; os_env.py:934 does shutil.copytree(src=cwd, ...) when fork=true. All agent file/shell tools are bounded by _assert_within_cwd (os_env.py:1040), which checks resolved.relative_to(cwd) — but since cwd is attacker-controlled, cwd=/ makes the entire host filesystem in-bounds for read and write; fork=true with cwd=/home/victim copies that tree into the agent-readable workspace.
  4. Decisive gate. omnigent/runner/resource_registry.py:648-654: cwd = default_cwd only when self._runner_workspace is not None or spec_os_env.cwd in (None, ".", "./"); otherwise cwd = spec_os_env.cwd (the attacker's absolute path). So OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE is the only thing standing between the spec and the host FS — and it is an operational control, not an in-code guard. A code comment at tool_dispatch.py:~4207 claims cwd "is treated as a boundary at session-create time," which is not true on this path.

Attack path

  1. Authenticated user sends POST /v1/sessions (multipart) with an agent bundle whose config.yaml contains: ``yaml os_env: cwd: "/" # or /home/<victim>, with fork: true for one-shot exfil sandbox: { type: none } ``
  2. On a runner without OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE, the agent's sys_os_read/write/edit/shell tools now operate over the whole host filesystem, and (sandbox inactive) inherit the runner's full environment — exposing host secrets via e.g. sys_os_shell("env").

Impact

Arbitrary host-filesystem read/write and runner-environment secret disclosure, available to any authenticated user on an affected deployment. High severity (deployment-conditional).

Suggested fix

Add a control on the cwd field itself in omnigent/spec/_validate_os_env (and/or at parse): reject absolute paths and .. traversal, and require cwd to resolve within the runner workspace / an allow-listed root. Do not rely on OMNIGENT_RUNNER_WORKSPACE being set as the sole defense. Consider also disallowing bundle-author sandbox.type: none for server-realized (non-CLI) sessions.

Related

GHSA-jrrm-9hc7-2v3h (same bundle-upload vector, different sink; that fix does not cover this).

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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