CVE-2026-63462: Unleash: Unauthenticated single-request DoS via OpenAPI validation error formatter
Summary An unauthenticated POST to any OpenAPI-validated endpoint, including the anonymous POST /edge/validate and POST /edge/issue-token, crashes the entire Unleash server with one request body of deeply-nested JSON. When request-body validation fails, Unleash builds the error message by calling JSON.stringify on the raw offending value taken from the request body.
Published Aug 21, 2026
Affected packages
unleash-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 7.5.2
- Fixed in
- 7.5.2
- Check
npm ls unleash-server
unleash-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 7.6.0, < 7.6.5
- Fixed in
- 7.6.5
- Check
npm ls unleash-server
unleash-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 8.0.0, < 8.0.2
- Fixed in
- 8.0.2
- Check
npm ls unleash-server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
An unauthenticated POST to any OpenAPI-validated endpoint, including the anonymous POST /edge/validate and POST /edge/issue-token, crashes the entire Unleash server with one request body of deeply-nested JSON.
When request-body validation fails, Unleash builds the error message by calling JSON.stringify on the raw offending value taken from the request body. A value nested a few thousand levels deep makes JSON.stringify recurse past the V8 call-stack limit and throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded.
The throw is synchronous inside an Express error-handling middleware that has no try/catch, and the process registers no uncaughtException handler (only unhandledRejection). Node terminates the process with exit(1).
The body parser sets no JSON nesting-depth limit, the payload (about 10 KB at depth 5000) stays far under the 100 KB body-size limit, and the same error formatter serves every API route, so the trigger is route-independent.
Result: a remote attacker with no account, token, or cookie takes the whole server offline with a single 10 KB request, and keeps it offline by replaying it.
Affected
Unleash OSS server, confirmed live-exploitable on v8.0.0 (unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0). Vulnerable code is the shared request-validation error path (src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts genericErrorMessage), present on current main. Reachable on a stock install: no feature flag, no setting, no authentication, no CSRF token, and no cookie required. The 100 KB request-body size limit does not mitigate it; the crashing payload is about 10 KB.
Root cause
On validation failure the error formatter serializes the raw offending request value with an unguarded const youSent = JSON.stringify(propertyValue) (src/lib/error/bad-data-error.ts:75), where propertyValue is read straight from the request body via lodash.get (bad-data-error.ts:123). A deeply-nested array or object makes JSON.stringify recurse once per level and throw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded. fromOpenApiValidationErrors (bad-data-error.ts:158) runs from the Express error middleware openAPIValidationMiddleware (src/lib/routes/controller.ts:68), which calls it with no try/catch (controller.ts:70), while the controller's own try/catch (controller.ts:103) wraps only the route handler. The process registers only process.on('unhandledRejection') (src/lib/server-impl.ts:274) and no uncaughtException handler, so the synchronous throw terminates Node with exit(1). The same unguarded pattern exists at fromJoiError (bad-data-error.ts:175) and at handleErrors (src/lib/routes/util.ts:42), whose own comment records that JSON.stringify(finalError.details) "also hangs" (util.ts:63).
Reproduction
unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.0 started from the repository docker-compose.yml, default config, no credentials, server at http://localhost:4242.
- A shallow body returns a normal 400 and the server stays up.
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4242/edge/validate \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"tokens":[[]]}'
# HTTP 400 BadDataError: "The `/body/tokens/0` property must be string. You sent []."- A single anonymous body nested 5000 levels deep (10013 bytes) crashes the process.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST http://localhost:4242/edge/validate \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary "$(python3 -c 'd=5000;print("{\"tokens\":["+"["*d+"]"*d+"]}")')"
# 000 (connection dropped mid-response; Node exited)- The server is gone and does not recover on its own.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://localhost:4242/health
# 000
docker inspect repo-web-1 --format '{{.State.Status}} restarts={{.RestartCount}}'
# exited restarts=0Live-verified: one anonymous 10013-byte request to /edge/validate drove /health from 200 to 000; the container logs showed the RangeError stack through bad-data-error and openAPIValidationMiddleware, and the process did not restart. The crash threshold is about 4000 to 4500 nesting levels; depth 5000 crashes reliably. The same crash reproduces on POST /edge/issue-token with a nested object, confirming route and shape independence.
Impact
- Single 10 KB request with no account, token, or cookie takes the entire server offline.
- Replaying the request (kilobits per restart interval) sustains a near-total outage; with no restart policy the first request is a permanent kill.
- Feature-flag evaluation sits on the request path of dependent applications, so the outage propagates to them.
- Every OpenAPI-validated endpoint is a trigger, including anonymous ones.
Credit
Jan Kahmen, turingpoint ([email protected])
Credited to kah-ja.
References
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/security/advisories/GHSA-r5pq-6chh-j3xp
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/b0e4da63249a9403bc209e0581db223326cb8dcf
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/d45f99df924c0d24747b3e45e46fcda7dcd3c1c1
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/commit/d862562a5ab8f2d1e40f6519c64cf0b4fdaf806d
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v7.5.2
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v7.6.5
- https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/releases/tag/v8.0.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r5pq-6chh-j3xp
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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