CVE-2026-63466: Unleash: Global Mustache.escape override disables HTML escaping process-wide, enabling Slack/Teams link-injection via unrestricted username
Vulnerability Details File: src/lib/addons/feature-event-formatter-md.ts Line: 355 (in v8.0.1; format() method) Root Cause FeatureEventFormatterMd.format() does: mustache (pinned ^4.2.0, confirmed installed 4.2.0) keeps escape as a module-level singleton (mustache.js: mustache.escape = escapeHtml;), read by every Mustache.render() call in the process unless a per-call config.escape override is passed (var escape =…
Published Aug 21, 2026
Affected packages
unleash-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 8.0.3
- Fixed in
- 8.0.3
- Check
npm ls unleash-server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Vulnerability Details
File: src/lib/addons/feature-event-formatter-md.ts Line: 355 (in v8.0.1; format() method)
Root Cause
FeatureEventFormatterMd.format() does:
Mustache.escape = (text) => text;
const text = Mustache.render(action, context);mustache (pinned ^4.2.0, confirmed installed 4.2.0) keeps escape as a module-level singleton (mustache.js: mustache.escape = escapeHtml;), read by every Mustache.render() call in the process unless a per-call config.escape override is passed (var escape = this.getConfigEscape(config) || mustache.escape;). Node's module cache guarantees every import Mustache from 'mustache' in the process — feature-event-formatter-md.ts, email-service.ts, webhook.ts, datadog.ts, new-relic.ts — shares the same object instance.
This assignment therefore permanently disables HTML escaping for every other `Mustache.render()` call in the same Node process (including email-service.ts templates) from the moment any single notification addon (Webhook, Slack legacy, Microsoft Teams, Datadog, New Relic) first formats any event, for the remaining lifetime of the process.
feature-event-formatter-md-events.ts (EVENT_MAP) confirms the blast radius: nearly every event's action template interpolates attacker-controlled values with single-mustache (intended-to-be-escaped) syntax, most importantly {{user}}, which is event.createdBy — the acting account's username (or email if set; src/lib/util/extract-user.ts: extractUsernameFromUser). Neither username nor name have any charset/length validation anywhere in the codebase (create-user-schema.ts, create-invited-user-schema.ts, user-service.ts:289 only does Joi.assert(name, Joi.string(), 'Name') — a type check, nothing more).
Slack's own API docs require &, <, > to be replaced with &, <, > before sending user-generated text, specifically so Slack's mrkdwn parser does not interpret it as <url|label> link syntax. Mustache's default escapeHtml happens to produce exactly those entities, so this was (likely unintentionally) the application's only defense against link-injection in chat notifications — and it is unconditionally switched off by the same code path that depends on it.
Attack Scenario
- Admin has a Webhook, Slack (legacy), Microsoft Teams, Datadog, or New Relic integration configured (a very common production setup for flag-change notifications).
- Attacker has (or self-registers, if public signup is enabled —
POST /invite/:token/signupispermission: NONE) any Editor-level account and setsusernameto e.g.evil<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>. - Attacker performs any ordinary write action (create/update/toggle a feature flag — routine, no special privilege beyond Editor on one project).
- The configured addon's
handleEvent()callsthis.msgFormatter.format(event), which mutates the global escape function and immediately renders the{{user}}-containing template with escaping disabled. - The resulting message — containing the attacker's raw
<url|label>Slack link syntax — is POSTed to the team's Slack/Teams channel or webhook endpoint and rendered as a real, clickable, attacker-labeled hyperlink inside a trusted automated notification feed.
Vulnerable Code
Mustache.escape = (text) => text;
const text = Mustache.render(action, context);
const url = path
? `${this.unleashUrl}${Mustache.render(path, context)}`
: undefined;Impact
- Stored markdown/link-injection (phishing-link injection) into any configured outbound notification channel (Slack legacy, MS Teams, Webhook default markdown, Datadog, New Relic), using an attacker-controlled username — no admin privilege required, only Editor on a single project, and potentially reachable through public self-signup.
- Secondary: loss of HTML escaping for any other reachable Mustache single-mustache placeholder process-wide until restart (increases severity of any other currently-unreached or future Mustache sink, e.g. email templates).
- Tertiary: a custom Webhook
bodyTemplatethat interpolates raw event/user fields directly into a JSON string literal (rather than the pre-escapedeventJsonfield the code already provides for this purpose) can have its JSON structure broken by an attacker-controlled"character once the global escape function is neutered.
Recommended Fix
Never mutate the shared Mustache.escape global. Pass a local escape function via Mustache's per-call render option instead (supported and typed in @types/[email protected]'s RenderOptions.escape):
const renderConfig = { escape: (text: string) => text };
const text = Mustache.render(action, context, undefined, renderConfig);
const url = path
? `${this.unleashUrl}${Mustache.render(path, context, undefined, renderConfig)}`
: undefined;Verification
Dynamically confirmed on v8.0.1 in a local Docker lab (official unleashorg/unleash-server:8.0.1 image + Postgres 15):
- Created a Webhook addon with the addon UI's own placeholder
bodyTemplate({{event.createdBy}}etc.), pointed at a local listener. - Created an Editor-role user with
username = evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>(accepted with HTTP 201, no sanitization). - Logged in as that user and created a feature flag (ordinary Editor action).
- Captured webhook payload:
"createdBy": "evil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>"—<,>,|completely unescaped, live Slack link-injection syntax. - Control test with the same pinned
[email protected]package confirmed the default (pre-bug) output for the same string would have beenevil2<https://attacker.example/urgent-rollback|Click here to view incident>— i.e. the single global assignment is solely responsible for the unescaped output observed live.
Credited to iaohkut-from-NightWolf-Team.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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