CVE-2026-67424: Flyto2 Core: Guarded HTTP modules follow redirects into internal space without per-hop SSRF revalidation
Summary The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allowredirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address;
Published Jul 30, 2026
Affected packages
flyto-core
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 2.26.6
- Fixed in
- 2.26.7
- Check
pip show flyto-core
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.
Root Cause
src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allow_redirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allow_redirects=follow_redirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for on_request_redirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.
Impact
Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.
Proof of Concept
Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT.
attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r -> 302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/...
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}Attack Chain
- Entry:
execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"}(attacker 302->internal). Guard:validate_url_with_env_config(url)(get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs onattacker.tld(public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target. - Sink:
session.get(url)(get.py:116) — noallow_redirectsarg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep ofhttp/foron_request_redirect/response.history→ NONE. - Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).
Bypass Evidence
Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allow_redirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.
Affected Versions
<= 2.26.6 — get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.
Suggested Fix
Set allow_redirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validate_url_with_env_config before following, or cap and re-check every hop.
Credit
Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).
Credited to manus-use.
References
- https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67424
- https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/0a0a528520ec18f5a21f1ddf858a71cc1edfb6e9
- https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.7
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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