CVE-2026-77315: Flyto2 Core: http.paginate follows server-supplied next-page URLs (Link header / cursor) without SSRF revalidation
Summary http.paginate validates only the initial baseurl, then follows server-supplied pagination targets (RFC 5988 Link: rel="next" headers, cursor/offset URLs) in a loop without revalidating each follow-up URL. An attacker's first-page response can point next at an internal address, causing a second-order SSRF whose internal body is aggregated into the returned items.
Published Nov 20, 2026
Affected packages
flyto-core
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 2.26.7
- Fixed in
- 2.26.8
- Check
pip show flyto-core
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
http.paginate validates only the initial base_url, then follows server-supplied pagination targets (RFC 5988 Link: rel="next" headers, cursor/offset URLs) in a loop without revalidating each follow-up URL. An attacker's first-page response can point next at an internal address, causing a second-order SSRF whose internal body is aggregated into the returned items.
Root Cause
src/core/modules/atomic/http/paginate.py:495 validates base_url (first URL only). The pagination loop _paginate_link_header reads next_url via _parse_link_header (:203), sets url=next_url (:208), and calls session.request(method, url) (:196) with NO validate call in the loop (:186-208 has zero guard calls).
Impact
Readable second-order SSRF that bypasses the SSRF control; internal/metadata body aggregated into all_items and returned to the caller (C:H, S:C).
Proof of Concept
Verified live: http.paginate with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a Link: <http://127.0.0.3/...>; rel="next" (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-NEXTPAGE-SECRET in the aggregated items.
execute_module http.paginate {"url":"http://attacker.tld/p1","strategy":"link_header"}
attacker p1 response header: Link: <http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/>; rel="next"Attack Chain
- Entry:
http.paginate {url:"http://attacker.tld/p1", strategy:"link_header"}. Guard:validate_url_with_env_config(base_url)(paginate.py:495) — validates the FIRST url only. - Sink:
_paginate_link_headerreadsnext_url(_parse_link_header:203),url=next_url(:208),session.request(method,url)(:196) — NO validate call in the loop. Bypass proof: only :495 validates; loop at :186-208 has zero guard calls. - Impact: internal body aggregated into
all_itemsand returned → readable second-order SSRF.
Bypass Evidence
Live PoC followed a Link header into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker in aggregated results. Only base_url is validated; the follow loop never revalidates.
Affected Versions
<= 2.26.6 — paginate.py:495 + loop present on latest release tag.
Suggested Fix
Run every follow-up URL (Link header, cursor, offset target) through validate_url_with_env_config before fetching it inside the pagination loop.
Credit
Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).
Credited to manus-use.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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