CVE-2026-68519: Glances: `--disable-config-exec` does not cover on-alert action commands (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-53925)
Summary In Glances 4.5.5 the --disable-config-exec flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop securepopen() from interpreting the shell operators &&, and in AMP command values taken from the configuration file. The hardening was not applied to the on-alert action command path, which reads its command lines from the same configuration file.
Published Aug 17, 2026
Affected packages
glances
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 4.5.5
- Fixed in
- 4.5.6
- Check
pip show glances
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
In Glances 4.5.5 the --disable-config-exec flag was extended (GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7) to stop secure_popen() from interpreting the shell operators &&, | and > in AMP command values taken from the configuration file. The hardening was not applied to the on-alert action command path, which reads its command lines from the same configuration file. As a result, with --disable-config-exec enabled, a configured alert action that contains > (file redirection), && (chaining) or | (pipe) still has those operators interpreted, allowing arbitrary file write / command chaining at the privilege of the glances process when the alert triggers.
Affected code
glances/actions.py (Glances 4.5.5, latest):
ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # line 111 — no allow_operators=, defaults to TrueBy contrast the AMP modules were fixed:
# glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69
self.set_result(secure_popen(res, allow_operators=self.allow_operators()).rstrip())
# glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60
res = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'), allow_operators=self.allow_operators())PoC (benign)
glances.conf:
[cpu]
user_critical=1
user_critical_action=echo MARKER > /tmp/poc_markerRun glances --disable-config-exec and generate CPU load. When the cpu user alert reaches CRITICAL, /tmp/poc_marker is created — i.e. the > operator was interpreted despite --disable-config-exec. The same > in an [amp_*] command value is correctly *not* interpreted.
Impact
Arbitrary file write (>), command chaining (&&) and pipe (|) from config-defined alert actions, contrary to the guarantee of --disable-config-exec. Trust boundary = the glances configuration file.
Suggested fix
Pass allow_operators=not args.disable_config_exec from GlancesActions.run() into secure_popen() (GlancesActions already holds args).
Credit
Reported via responsible-disclosure incomplete-fix measurement study.
Credited to sec-reex.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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