CVE-2026-68520: Glances: as_dict_secure() Value-Level Bypass Leaks Credentials in URL Values via /api/4/config
Summary Glances provides asdictsecure() explicitly designed for unauthenticated API access, with a docstring stating it returns "a sanitised copy of the configuration dict" where "Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by ''". However, the implementation only checks KEY names against a regex pattern and never inspects VALUE content.
Published Aug 17, 2026
Affected packages
glances
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.5.6
- Fixed in
- 4.5.6
- Check
pip show glances
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Glances provides as_dict_secure() explicitly designed for unauthenticated API access, with a docstring stating it returns "a sanitised copy of the configuration dict" where "Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'". However, the implementation only checks KEY names against a regex pattern and never inspects VALUE content. The documented [ip] config section supports public_api (URL), public_username (login), and public_password (password). While public_password is correctly masked, both public_api (when containing embedded credentials like https://user:pass@host/) and public_username are returned in full to unauthenticated users via GET /api/4/config.
Affected Versions
Glances latest (Docker: nicolargo/glances:latest)
Root Cause
In glances/config.py, as_dict_secure():
_SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile(r"password|token|secret|api_key|apikey|ssl_keyfile", re.IGNORECASE)
def as_dict_secure(self):
"""Return a sanitised copy of the configuration dict.
Intended for unauthenticated API access.
- Sensitive keys in remaining sections are replaced by '********'.
"""
sanitized = {}
for section, options in self.as_dict().items():
if section in _SECURE_BLOCKED_SECTIONS: continue
sanitized[section] = {
key: "********" if _SECURE_SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) else value
for key, value in options.items()
}
return sanitizedIn glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:
# Line 1294
args_json = self.config.as_dict() if self.args.password else self.config.as_dict_secure()The [ip] config section documents: public_api (URL), public_username (login), public_password (password).
public_password→ matches "password" → masked ✓public_api→ no match → returned in full (containsuser:pass@in URL) ✗public_username→ no match → returned in full ✗
Impact
- Unauthenticated credential disclosure via
GET /api/4/configorGET /api/4/config/ip as_dict_secure()exists specifically to protect credentials in no-auth mode but fails to maskpublic_usernameand credential-bearing URLs inpublic_api
Prerequisites
- Glances in web server mode without
--password(default, no auth) glances.conf[ip]section withpublic_apicontaining embedded credentials and/orpublic_usernameset
Environment
- Glances latest (Docker:
nicolargo/glances:latest) - Remote Docker lab at
http://10.140.200.102:8080
Reproduction Steps
docker run -d --name glances-test -p 8080:61208 -e GLANCES_OPT='-w' nicolargo/glances:latest
sleep 20
docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|public_api=https://ipv4.ipleak.net/json/|public_api=https://admin:[email protected]/json/|' /etc/glances/glances.conf
docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_username=<myname>|public_username=myname|' /etc/glances/glances.conf
docker exec glances-test sed -i 's|#public_password=<mysecret>|public_password=mysecret|' /etc/glances/glances.conf
docker restart glances-test
sleep 15
curl -s "$TARGET/api/4/config/ip"
# Returns: {"public_api": "https://admin:secret123@...", "public_username": "myname", "public_password": "********"}Evidence
See C:/Tools/glances-config-leak-evidence.txt.
Dedup Check
- GHSA-gfc2-9qmw-w7vh covers CORS but NOT value-level credential leak
- No existing GHSA covers
as_dict_secure()value-level filtering gap - 13 published GHSA, none covering this issue
Suggested Remediation
Add "username" and "login" to sensitive key pattern, and check values for embedded credentials in URLs.
Disclosure Timeline
- 2026-07-28: Vulnerability discovered and verified via Docker deployment
Reporter
GitHub username: Todor
Credited to 0xTodor.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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