CVE-2026-71317: Lemur: Sub-CA creation never checks `AuthorityPermission` on the parent authority
Summary Repo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur When ADMINONLYAUTHORITYCREATION=False (an explicitly supported and documented configuration), POST /api/1/authorities with type=subca never verifies that the caller holds AuthorityPermission on the supplied parent authority.
Published Aug 18, 2026
Affected packages
lemur
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.9.2
- Fixed in
- 1.9.3
- Check
pip show lemur
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Repo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur
When ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False (an explicitly supported and documented configuration), POST /api/1/authorities with type=subca never verifies that the caller holds AuthorityPermission on the supplied parent authority. The parent field is resolved by AssociatedAuthoritySchema via a raw fetch_objects(Authority, data) lookup, then passed straight through service.create → mint → cryptography-issuer.create_authority, which loads options["parent"].authority_certificate.private_key and signs a brand-new intermediate CA on the caller's behalf.
Any authenticated non-read-only user can therefore mint a sub-CA chained to any internal root whose private key Lemur holds — including roots they hold no role on — attach a role they already belong to, and immediately issue or offline-sign trusted leaf certificates for arbitrary names.
Affected route
POST /api/1/authorities (with type=subca)
Affected code
- `lemur/authorities/views.py:231` — gates only on
AuthorityCreatorPermission()+StrictRolePermission(); noAuthorityPermissionondata['parent'] - `lemur/authorities/schemas.py:58` —
parent = fields.Nested(AssociatedAuthoritySchema);validate_subcaonly checks presence - `lemur/schemas.py:107` —
AssociatedAuthoritySchema.get_object→fetch_objects(Authority, data)resolves any authority by id/name with no permission check - `lemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.py:40` —
private_key = options["authority"].authority_certificate.private_key(set fromoptions["parent"]) signs the new intermediate - `lemur/auth/permissions.py:62` —
AuthorityCreatorPermissionbecomes always-allow whenADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False - `lemur/certificates/views.py:538` —
is_private_authority(true forcryptography-issuer) skipsUSER_DOMAIN_AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDERfor subsequent leaf issuance
Impact
In deployments that set ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False to enable self-service CA creation, any authenticated non-read-only user — with zero permission on a given internal root CA — can obtain a working intermediate CA chained to that root. They can then:
- Issue TLS certificates for arbitrary names trusted by every relying party that trusts the internal root, bypassing
LEMUR_ALLOWED_DOMAINS, sensitive-domain flags, and the per-user domain-authorization plugin. - Export the sub-CA private key and sign end-entity certificates entirely outside Lemur, defeating all in-product issuance controls.
This converts "can create a self-contained test CA" into "can mint trusted certs under any internal PKI root in the organisation". The ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION documentation does not warn operators of this consequence.
Root cause
AuthoritiesList.post evaluates AuthorityCreatorPermission (a global "may create authorities" flag) and StrictRolePermission, but never evaluates AuthorityPermission(parent.id, parent.roles) against the caller-supplied parent. AssociatedAuthoritySchema is a pure lookup schema with no authz hook, and neither authorities.service.create nor mint re-check before invoking issuer_plugin.create_authority(options). The bundled cryptography-issuer then uses the parent's stored private key directly.
Validated evidence
Static trace, confirmed by code inspection (validation status: CONFIRMED):
parentis loaded viaAssociatedAuthoritySchema(rawfetch_objects), passed unchecked throughviews.post → service.create → mint → plugin.create_authority → issue_certificate, where the parent authority's stored private key is read and used to sign the new intermediate.- No call to
AuthorityPermission(parent.id, ...)exists anywhere on this path. - Precondition
ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=Falseis an explicitly supported config (`docs/administration.rst:517`).
Proof of concept / reproducer
Status: reconstructed from source report (static control-flow trace; not executed against a live CA).
Preconditions: ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False; attacker is an authenticated Lemur user holding any role other than read-only; <PARENT_AUTHORITY_ID> is any internal cryptography-issuer root CA the attacker holds no role on; <ATTACKER_ROLE> is any role the attacker already belongs to.
curl -sS -X POST "<TARGET_BASE_URL>/api/1/authorities" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <AUTH_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "attacker-subca",
"owner": "[email protected]",
"description": "poc",
"type": "subca",
"parent": {"id": <PARENT_AUTHORITY_ID>},
"plugin": {"slug": "cryptography-issuer"},
"roles": [{"name": "<ATTACKER_ROLE>"}],
"commonName": "attacker-intermediate",
"validityYears": 1
}'The response contains a new authority whose authority_certificate is signed by <PARENT_AUTHORITY_ID>'s private key. The caller is recorded as creator and holds <ATTACKER_ROLE> on it, so POST /api/1/certificates against the new authority succeeds (and skips allowed_issuance_for_domain because is_private_authority is true).
Static-trace validation command from the source report:
grep -n 'parent' lemur/authorities/schemas.py lemur/authorities/views.py lemur/authorities/service.py \
&& sed -n '37,55p' lemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.pySource artifact: audit/harnesses/public-repo-threat-model-harness/results/netflix-lemur-100run-mythos-20260627T051129Z/findings.jsonl (run_022, finding cluster lemur-subca-parent-authz, 5/100 runs).
Suggested fix
In AuthoritiesList.post (or authorities.service.create), when data.get('parent') is present, enforce AuthorityPermission(parent.id, [r.name for r in parent.roles]).can() before invoking the issuer plugin, regardless of ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION. Additionally, update the ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION documentation to state that disabling it currently grants every authenticated user the ability to chain sub-CAs off any internal root whose private key Lemur holds. Consider also requiring admin (or an explicit per-parent capability) for any type=subca creation independent of the global flag.
Credited to maperu.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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