CVE-2026-72798: SiYuan: Publish-access filter on renderAttributeView leaves related-database content unfiltered and fails open on non-block first columns
CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72798. Summary renderAttributeView correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter's row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row's first cell, and it never inspects the remaining cells' values.
Published Sep 4, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260724121519-426991d155c0
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260724121519-426991d155c0
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72798.
Summary
renderAttributeView correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter's row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row's first cell, and it never inspects the remaining cells' values. Relation and Rollup cells carry mirrored content from a *different* database, so a row belonging to a published database can hand an anonymous reader the contents of a related database whose host document is hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected. Separately, when the first column is not a block value the accessibility check is skipped entirely and the row is returned unchecked.
Note:
This is distinct from the previously reported password-tier omission in the same function that concerns the row's own primary block, whereas these two defects concern (a) other cells' related-database content, which no row-level check covers and (b) rows where the first cell is not a block at all. A fix to the row-drop condition alone would close neither.
Details
renderAttributeView applies the filter (kernel/api/av.go:68):
retDataMap["view"] = model.FilterViewByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, retDataMap["view"].(av.Viewable))Inside FilterViewByPublishAccess (kernel/model/publish_access.go):
if row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil {
bt = treenode.GetBlockTree(row.Cells[0].Value.Block.ID)
}
if bt != nil {
if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {
row = nil // drop
}
}
// every other cell in the row is returned as-is(a) Relation and Rollup cells leak the related database. These value types carry mirrored content, not just references:
type ValueRelation struct { BlockIDs []string; Contents []*Value }
type ValueRollup struct { Contents []*Value }The render pipeline populates them from a different attribute view e.g. kernel/model/attribute_view.go:2731:
v.GroupVal.Relation.Contents = []*av.Value{ relationDestAv.GetBlockValue(groupValue) }relationDestAv is a separate database that may live in a hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected document. When a published database's row survives the filter (because its column-0 document is public), its Relation and Rollup columns return the related, non-published database's content block text, titles, and mirrored column values. FilterViewByPublishAccess performs no publish-access evaluation on Relation.Contents or Rollup.Contents.
(b) Fail-open when column 0 is not a block. bt is assigned only when row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil. If the first column is a non-block type (Relation, Text, …) or the row is detached, bt remains nil, the if bt != nil guard is skipped, and the row is returned with no accessibility check at all. Column order is user-reorderable, so any database whose first column is not the document block bypasses row filtering entirely.
Verified at origin/master (eef105683).
Proof of Concept
Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Two databases: DB-A hosted in a published document, DB-B hosted in a publish-forbidden or password-protected document, with a Relation column in DB-A pointing at DB-B and containing a distinctive marker value.
(a) Related-database content disclosure:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView
{"id":"<DB_A_AV_ID>"}Rows of DB-A are returned (correctly, since its host document is public), and their Relation/Rollup cell Contents include DB-B's block text and mirrored column values, despite DB-B's host document being excluded from publishing.
(b) Fail-open row: Reorder DB-A so its first column is a non-block type (or use a detached row), mark its host document publish-forbidden, and request the same endpoint the row is returned without any accessibility evaluation.
*Verification status:* both defects are confirmed by code inspection at origin/master. A live demonstration requires a build from HEAD with two linked databases; available on request.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read content from databases whose host documents are hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected, by requesting a *published* database that relates to them. Because relation graphs are commonly used to link a public index to private detail records, this exposes exactly the data the publish boundary is meant to withhold. The fail-open path additionally returns rows with no accessibility check whenever the first column is not a block value, which is a user-controlled layout property. Confidentiality-only.
Suggested fix
In FilterViewByPublishAccess:
- For each retained row, evaluate every
Relation.ContentsandRollup.Contentsentry againstCheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess(including the publish-password tier) and drop or mask entries that fail. - Fail closed: when
row.Cells[0]has no accessible block (Value.Block == nilorbt == nil), drop the row rather than returning it unchecked.
Credited to Shirshakhtml.
References
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-mfrj-v65r-979c
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72798
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/426991d155c0c7c3a9e71badd6761eddfa8aad5b
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-renderattributeview
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfrj-v65r-979c
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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