CVE-2026-82392: pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph
Summary The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/[email protected]) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install.
Published Sep 2, 2026
Affected packages
pnpm
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.34.5
- Fixed in
- 10.34.5
- Check
npm ls pnpm
pnpm
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 11.0.0, < 11.11.0
- Fixed in
- 11.11.0
- Check
npm ls pnpm
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using path.join(modules, pkgName) where pkgName is extracted from lockfile packages keys via dp.parse(depPath).name without validation. A crafted pnpm-lock.yaml with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., ../../../tmp/[email protected]) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during pnpm install.
This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the safeJoinModulesDir containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and symlinkDependency but NOT to the virtual store linker's lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.
Details
Root Cause
dp.parse() at pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135 extracts the package name as:
const name = dependencyPath.substring(0, sepIndex)This is a raw substring operation with zero validation that name is a valid npm package name. A depPath of ../../../tmp/[email protected] yields name = '../../../tmp/pwned'.
Vulnerable Code Path
pnpm-lock.yaml→lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]'](attacker-controlled lockfile key)nameVerFromPkgSnapshot(depPath, pkgSnapshot)atlockfile/utils/src/nameVerFromPkgSnapshot.ts:16→ callsdp.parse(depPath)→ returns{ name: '../../../../../../../tmp/pwned' }lockfileToDepGraph.ts:232→modules = path.join(dirInVirtualStore, 'node_modules')lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233→dir = path.join(modules, pkgName)→ resolves to/tmp/pwned(ESCAPES virtual store)storeController.importPackage(depNode.dir, ...)→ writes package content to the traversed path
Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It
- `depPathToFilename()` — replaces
/with+for thedirInVirtualStorepath, butpkgNamecomes SEPARATELY fromdp.parse()and is NOT passed through this function - `verifyLockfileResolutions()` — validates dependency map keys (aliases) via
isValidDependencyAlias(), but never validates the depPath keys themselves - Lockfile parser —
yaml.load(lockfileRawContent)with no schema validation onpackageskeys - `importPackage()` — accepts
targetDirand passes it directly tocafsStore.importPackage(targetDir, ...)with zero containment check - Integrity verification — requires a real fetchable package but does not validate the destination path
Escalation to RCE (non-default config)
When dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true is configured (or the traversal package name is in the explicit allowBuilds list), the same traversed path is used in the rebuild phase at after-install/src/index.ts:402,470. The attacker's postinstall script then executes with the victim's shell access. Under default config, allowBuild returns false for unknown packages, limiting impact to arbitrary file write.
Also Affected (PnP linker)
When nodeLinker: pnp is configured, lockfileToPackageRegistry() at lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110 uses the same unvalidated dp.parse().name in packageLocation construction, allowing the .pnp.cjs resolver map to point outside the virtual store. This is a lower-impact variant (PnP is not the default linker).
Impact
An attacker who can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml to a repository (or supply one via a malicious package) can cause arbitrary file writes on the machine of any user who runs pnpm install. Written content is the actual package files from a real npm package (attacker controls which package and which destination).
Targets for arbitrary file write include:
.git/hooks/pre-commit— code execution on next git operation~/.local/bin/— binary hijacking- Project source files — supply chain injection
Reproduction
Craft a pnpm-lock.yaml:
lockfileVersion: '9.0'
packages:
../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-<real-package-integrity>}
engines: {node: '>=14'}
snapshots:
../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]: {}
importers:
.:
dependencies:
legitimate-name:
specifier: ^1.0.0
version: ../../../../../../../tmp/[email protected]Run pnpm install — package content is written to /tmp/pwned/ instead of the virtual store.
Recommended Fix
Apply safeJoinModulesDir (or equivalent validation) at:
lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233—path.join(modules, pkgName)after-install/src/index.ts:402—path.join(pkgModulesDir(depPath), pkgInfo.name)lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110— PnPpackageLocation
Alternatively, validate depPath keys during lockfile parsing to reject any that don't produce valid npm package names via dp.parse().
Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv
GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv fixed the hoisted linker path (lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222) by adding safeJoinModulesDir. The same fix was NOT applied to the virtual store linker, which uses the identical dp.parse().name → path.join() pattern at lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233.
Credited to manus-use.
References
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82392
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12890
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/78e29fe5583a1e5d69ea05e414eff310f78d5ed9
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.11.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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