GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57: pnpm: `patch-remove` could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory
Summary The patch-remove deletion-scope issue tracked as GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57 / CAND-PNPM-030 has been addressed in pnpm. A crafted patch entry could resolve outside the configured patches directory and cause pnpm patch-remove to delete an arbitrary reachable file.
Published Jun 27, 2026
Affected packages
pnpm
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 10.34.4
- Fixed in
- 10.34.4
- Check
npm ls pnpm
pnpm
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- >= 11.0.0, < 11.7.0
- Fixed in
- 11.7.0
- Check
npm ls pnpm
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The patch-remove deletion-scope issue tracked as GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57 / CAND-PNPM-030 has been addressed in pnpm.
A crafted patch entry could resolve outside the configured patches directory and cause pnpm patch-remove to delete an arbitrary reachable file. This patch validates the configured directory and every resolved target before unlinking anything, then deletes the final directory entry without following it.
Security boundary
- Traversal and absolute paths that resolve outside the configured patches directory are rejected before deletion.
- Parent directories are canonicalized before deletion, including the case where a nested symlink points outside and the final outside entry is itself dangling.
- The complete batch is validated before any file is removed.
- Component-aware predicates accept valid names beginning with
..while still rejecting parent traversal, Windows drive escapes, and UNC escapes. - Valid files and symlinked patch directories whose canonical targets remain below the lockfile directory continue to work.
- A final symlink inside a valid patch directory is unlinked without following its target, including when the target is outside or dangling.
Exploit replay
Before the patch, a workspace patchedDependencies path that resolved outside the project caused pnpm patch-remove to delete the external sentinel. A second replay used a nested parent symlink and a dangling outside victim: realpath() returned ENOENT, yet the victim was still removed. With this patch, both paths are rejected and the outside entries remain intact.
Files changed
patching/commands/src/isSubdirectory.tsperforms component-aware containment checks.patching/commands/src/patchRemove.tsvalidates the full batch, canonicalizes parents, and unlinks final entries without following them.patching/commands/test/{isSubdirectory,patchRemove}.test.tscovers traversal, nested symlinks, dangling victims, and valid removals.
Commands run
$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/patching.commands test test/isSubdirectory.test.ts test/patchRemove.test.ts
PASS: 11 tests across 2 suites
$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/patching.commands run compile
PASS
$ git diff --check
PASSValidation
- Focused handler and path-predicate suites: 11 passed across 2 suites.
- Package-wide ESLint: passed.
- Package TypeScript build: passed.
- Commit hooks, Commitlint, and
git diff --check: passed. - The broader integration harness was environment-blocked because it writes outside the available temporary root; focused handler tests used
/private/tmp.
Patches
10.34.4: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/352ae489f1b14ffdc19d2c6eacb1b06b098c2ddc 11.7.0: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/612a2e6a7333f2b061f452a21b6e62c1c161747f
Compatibility
Missing patch files remain no-ops. Valid symlinked patch directories continue to work when their canonical target stays inside the lockfile directory, and final symlinks are removed without touching their targets. patch-remove is not yet in pacquet's command surface, so no Rust-side parity change is required.
Remaining risk
Portable Node APIs do not expose directory-fd-relative unlinkat(). A local attacker who can replace an already validated parent directory before the unlink may still win a time-of-check/time-of-use race. The reproduced repository-controlled traversal and symlink paths do not require that concurrent capability and are blocked by this patch.
--- Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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