GHSA-57v5-wqx3-cgj4: SiYuan: Database view structure (all view names, layout types and per-field visibility) is returned to anonymous readers by /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews
Scope note (please read first) This endpoint does not exist in v3.7.3 or on master. It was introduced on the development branch by commit acfc02ee8 ("Improve database field visibility across views", #11020) and is live on v3.7.4-alpha.1, so it will ship in v3.7.4 unless gated first. No released stable version is affected.
Published Sep 8, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260726004013-64c26e74bb82
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260726004013-64c26e74bb82
- Check
go list -m github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Scope note (please read first)
This endpoint does not exist in v3.7.3 or on master. It was introduced on the development branch by commit acfc02ee8 ("Improve database field visibility across views", #11020) and is live on v3.7.4-alpha.1, so it will ship in v3.7.4 unless gated first. No released stable version is affected.
Summary
/api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews is registered with CheckAuth only and applies no publish-access filtering. Given a database avID, it returns the complete view structure of that database: every view's name, icon, layout type and the per-field Hidden flag, regardless of whether the caller is authorized to see that database or those views.
The route registered immediately before it, getAttributeViewKeys, does gate reader roles.
Details
| Item | Detail | | Route | `kernel/api/router.go:530` `POST /api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getAttributeViewFieldViews` | | Middleware | `CheckAuth` only, no `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole` | | Guard in handler | None. Greps for `IsReadOnlyRoleContext`, `publishAccess` and `Filter*` all return zero matches | | Exposed | For each entry in `attrView.Views`: `ID`, `Icon`, `Name`, `Type`, and the `Hidden` flag for the requested field | | Introduced by | `acfc02ee8` (feature), dev branch only |
The leak path. The handler binds avID and keyID, validating them against the ID pattern only, then calls GetAttributeViewFieldViews(avID, keyID). That function calls av.ParseAttributeView(avID), which reads the database's storage file directly by identifier. There is no ownership check and no publish-access check anywhere on the path. The result is a per-view record for every view the database defines.
What a reader learns is author-written: view names are typed by the user, and layout type distinguishes a table from a gallery or kanban. The Hidden flag additionally reveals, per view, which fields the author chose to conceal.
Guarded sibling, one route earlier. getAttributeViewKeys (kernel/api/router.go:529) is also reader-reachable and does gate:
if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {
blockAttributeViewKeys = model.FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, ...)
}The new route at 530 applies nothing equivalent.
This is worth flagging as more than an isolated omission. acfc02ee8 added a new reader-reachable attribute-view endpoint during the same development cycle in which the surrounding attribute-view endpoints were being hardened. The same pattern produced an earlier exposure: f2d966659, which added encrypted-notebook unlock status for plugin consumption, created a reader-reachable disclosure on a surface that was otherwise being tightened. A check on new reader-reachable routes against the gating applied to their registered neighbours would catch this class before release.
Reachability, stated honestly. The endpoint requires a valid avID and keyID. renderAttributeView supplies both to a reader for any database embedded in a document the reader can access. The realistic target is therefore a partially-published database: the document publishes one view, and this endpoint enumerates the existence, name, layout type and hidden-field configuration of the database's other views, including views the author did not publish. Against a database with no reader-accessible surface at all, obtaining the identifiers is harder, particularly since the getAttributeViewKeysByID enumeration path was closed on the development branch. The severity below reflects that constraint rather than a worst case.
Proof of Concept
Precondition: v3.7.4-alpha.1 build, publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. A database embedded in a reader-accessible document, with at least one additional view that is not published.
Step 1, obtain the identifiers through the reader-accessible path:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView
{"id":"<block id of the embedded database in a published doc>"}
→ 200, returns the published view together with its key identifiersStep 2, enumerate the rest of the database's views:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/getAttributeViewFieldViews
{"avID":"<avID from step 1>","keyID":"<keyID from step 1>"}
→ 200, returns a record per view: ID, Icon, Name, Type, HiddenThe response includes views that were never published, disclosing their author-written names, their layout types, and which field is hidden in each.
Impact
An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, can enumerate the full view structure of a database when only part of that database is published. View names are author-written free text and frequently describe the data they filter, so this discloses the existence and subject matter of unpublished views. The per-field Hidden flags additionally reveal the author's concealment choices across those views. Confidentiality only, with no integrity or availability impact, and bounded by the reader needing identifiers obtainable from a reader-accessible database.
Suggested fix
Gate the handler for read-only roles, mirroring getAttributeViewKeys: when IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) holds, resolve the block that owns the avID and apply the publish-access check before returning any view record, or filter the returned set through the same FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess path its neighbour uses.
Credited to shirshakopencti.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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