GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q: Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)
Summary The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's…
Published Oct 2, 2026
Affected packages
trigger.dev
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.5.1
- Fixed in
- 4.5.2
- Check
npm ls trigger.dev
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The run replay action function at apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts has no authentication or authorization check. While the loader (GET) in the same file properly calls requireUser(request) and scopes queries to the user's organizations, the action (POST) at line 166 does neither — allowing any authenticated user to replay task runs from any organization by knowing the run's friendlyId.
Details
Vulnerable file: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.taskruns.$runParam.replay.ts
The `loader` (line 28-29) — properly authenticated:
export async function loader({ request, params }: LoaderFunctionArgs) {
const user = await requireUser(request); // ✓ Auth check
const userId = user.id;
// ... queries scoped to user's orgs
}The `action` (line 166-193) — NO authentication:
export const action: ActionFunction = async ({ request, params }) => {
const { runParam } = ParamSchema.parse(params);
// ✗ NO requireUser() call
// ✗ NO requireUserId() call
// ✗ NO org membership check
const taskRun = await prisma.taskRun.findFirst({
where: {
friendlyId: runParam, // Queries ANY run, no org scoping
},
include: {
runtimeEnvironment: { select: { slug: true } },
project: { include: { organization: true } },
},
});
// ... proceeds to replay the run in the victim's environment
const replayRunService = new ReplayTaskRunService();The Prisma query at line 177 fetches the run by friendlyId only — no userId or organization filter. The ReplayTaskRunService then creates a new task run in the victim's environment, executing with the victim's environment variables and secrets.
Same bug class exists in: apps/webapp/app/routes/resources.batches.$batchId.check-completion.ts (line 17) — the action has zero authentication, allowing any user to trigger batch completion for any batch ID.
PoC
Run replay IDOR:
# Any authenticated user can replay any org's task run
POST /resources/taskruns/run_abc123def/replay
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
environmentId=<victim-env-id>&failedRedirect=/The friendlyId values (e.g., run_abc123def) are short, incrementing strings that can be enumerated.
Batch completion (same bug class):
# Any authenticated user can trigger batch completion for any batch
POST /resources/batches/<batchId>/check-completion
Cookie: <any-valid-session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
redirectUrl=/Impact
- Cross-organization task execution: An attacker can replay task runs belonging to other organizations, executing tasks in the victim's environment with the victim's secrets and API keys
- Secret exposure: Replayed tasks run with the victim organization's environment variables, which may contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets
- Resource consumption: Attacker consumes the victim's compute quota by replaying their tasks
- Data integrity: The batch completion endpoint can prematurely resume parent tasks waiting for batch results, causing data integrity issues
- Low attack complexity:
friendlyIdvalues are short, predictable strings — enumeration is feasible
Credited to sajdakabir, zerotrail-ai.
References
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesGHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62
Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel
medium5.4Oct 2, 2026GHSA-59h8-w5q6-mfmp
Trigger.dev: Unauthenticated Realtime Stream Data Injection via Run FriendlyId
medium5.3Oct 2, 2026GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw
Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name
high7.7Oct 2, 2026GHSA-fj2x-mqqp-3v2w
Trigger.dev: Trigger CLI debug deployment logs expose resolved environment secret values
medium5.5Oct 2, 2026GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp
Trigger.dev: V1 coordinator default-secret unauth Socket.IO
critical9.2Oct 2, 2026GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x
Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise
high8.1Oct 2, 2026
