GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4: Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook
Summary A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied url. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (alertsWorker - DeliverAlertService) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via fetch(webhook.url, ...).
Published Oct 2, 2026
Affected packages
trigger.dev
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 4.5.1
- Fixed in
- 4.5.2
- Check
npm ls trigger.dev
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied url. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (alertsWorker -> DeliverAlertService) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via fetch(webhook.url, ...). The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for 169.254, isPrivate, isLoopback, net.isIP, ssrf returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just z.string().optional() (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or 169.254.169.254 and the multi-tenant server fetches it.
Affected
apps/webapp, HEAD 5d99457 (current main).
Root cause
- Source (API route):
app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.tsApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()(no host validation); routeapp/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts(PAT-auth). - Store:
app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.tspersists{url, secret, version}verbatim. - Sink:
app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973fetch(webhook.url, {method:"POST", headers:{"x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256":...}, body:rawPayload}); identical atdeliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:258. Runs inside the webapp process;fetchfollows redirects (IMDSv1-via-redirect). No egress guard anywhere.
Runtime PoC (proven on self-host)
Seeded a project + STAGING env + a WEBHOOK channel with url=http://host.docker.internal:7766/... (an internal address from the server's POV) + a DEPLOYING deployment. Triggered via the public API POST /api/v1/deployments/deployment_ssrfpoc/fail -> 200 -> FAILED -> alertsWorker -> the server fetched the listener. Captured:
POST /ssrf-via-webhook HTTP/1.1
host: host.docker.internal:7766
x-trigger-signature-hmacsha256: <redacted>
user-agent: node
{"type":"alert.deployment.failed", ...}The webapp server (user-agent: node) made an outbound POST to the attacker-chosen internal URL; 169.254.169.254 / any internal host works identically.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N ~ Medium. Blind (response not reflected) + POST-only (fixed body = signed alert payload), so it enables internal port/host scanning (delivery success/timing oracle), state-changing POSTs to internal services, and IMDSv1-via-redirect — not arbitrary GET exfiltration. PR:L (authenticated tenant). Egress private-IP/metadata blocking on server-issued webhooks is industry standard; its absence is the defect.
Suggested fix
Validate the webhook URL on create (require http(s), resolve host, reject private/link-local/loopback/metadata ranges) AND re-check at fetch time (re-resolve after redirects or disable redirects / pin to resolved public IP). A shared assertPublicUrl(url) used by createAlertChannel + the two delivery sinks.
Dup
Distinct CWE-918 class from the IDOR advisories. FRESH. (The Grav maintainer independently hardened the same webhook-URL-SSRF class in grav-plugin-api commit dfcc947 on 2026-06-26 — corroborating the class is real and fixable.)
Credited to CyberKareem, dizconnectz.
References
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4199
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254
- https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More npm vulnerabilities
All npm entriesGHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62
Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel
medium5.4Oct 2, 2026GHSA-59h8-w5q6-mfmp
Trigger.dev: Unauthenticated Realtime Stream Data Injection via Run FriendlyId
medium5.3Oct 2, 2026GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw
Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name
high7.7Oct 2, 2026GHSA-fj2x-mqqp-3v2w
Trigger.dev: Trigger CLI debug deployment logs expose resolved environment secret values
medium5.5Oct 2, 2026GHSA-gg6r-gp4c-89hp
Trigger.dev: V1 coordinator default-secret unauth Socket.IO
critical9.2Oct 2, 2026GHSA-pp95-gc86-jq6q
Trigger.dev: Missing Authentication in Run Replay Action Allows Cross-Organization Task Execution (IDOR)
high7.1Oct 2, 2026
